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INTRODUCTION 
To deny all remedy is to deny the right itself. Judges can 
deny any enforcement of the plaintiff’s right where the 
plaintiff has forfeited the right by his conduct, as in es-
toppel cases. Judges can also deny remedies on the basis 
of cost-benefit balances. But not so easy to think that the 
Congress means statutory rights to come and go in the 
discretion of a federal judge. Indeed, the concept of a 
right is at odds with the concept of discretion to deny the 
right.1 
This Article addresses the current debate over whether to ex-
tend, to trademark law, the rule in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C. denying prevailing patent plaintiffs presumptive entitlement 
to injunctive relief.2 Its central concern, however, is not whether or 
how eBay should apply to trademark law, but rather the way in 
which the debate resurfaces structural flaws undermining founda-
tional provisions of the Lanham Act. Namely, the Act purports to 
grant ex ante exclusive rights to mark owners against all confusing-
ly similar uses, but then reserves discretion to district courts to de-
ny statutory injunctive relief without further guidance.3 This ambi-
guity, a familiar one to the broader subject area of statutory injunc-
tions, is particularly acute in the trademark space because the Lan-
ham Act conflictingly aimed both to codify state-based common 
law trademark practices, and to create a national statutory right. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the debate over eBay’s place in 
trademark infringement law, revealing the trouble this issue has 
posed for federal courts and commentators alike.4 Subsequent de-
cisions reveal deep conflicts at the appellate level and widespread 
confusion among the district courts. Commentators, too, seem un-
able to reach consensus. Practitioners and black letter trademark 
                                                                                                                            
1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.10, at 248 (2d ed. 1993). 
2 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
3 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012). 
4 This Article does not directly address what impact, if any, eBay has had on 
alternative Lanham Act causes of actions such as dilution, false advertising, and 
cybersquatting. Instead, it focuses on the core of trademark law—claims for infringement 
of registered and unregistered trademarks under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and § 1125(a)(1)(A) 
(Lanham Act sections 32 and 43(a)(1)(A), respectively). 
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authorities, like Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, largely reject eBay 
as inconsistent with the purpose of trademark law and structure of 
trademark litigation. On the other end of the spectrum, some scho-
lars have embraced eBay as a check on overzealous plaintiffs, in-
cluding in the trademark space. Adding to the confusion, the avail-
able empirical data counterintuitively suggest that trademark in-
junction win rates have actually increased overall since eBay. 
Part II seeks to locate the source of this difficulty and conflict. 
It first sets the groundwork by contrasting the nature of trademark 
and patent rights in order to reject a common reductive statutory 
argument for extending eBay to trademark law. It then seeks to con-
textualize the debate by positioning it as a particularly knotty in-
stance of the intertwining of equitable discretion with statutory in-
junctive authority. In the trademark case, the Lanham Act purports 
to create a strong form of exclusive right in registered marks. Yet it 
then gives discretion to courts to deny injunctive relief even where 
plaintiff has demonstrated infringement of this exclusive right and 
shown likely continuing harm (to itself and the public). At the same 
time, it denies monetary relief except in exceptional cases. 
The problem, at heart, is one of statutory construction. This 
Article thus turns to the drafting history of the Lanham Act to bet-
ter understand how the drafters intended to reconcile exclusive 
trademark rights with judicial discretion. It argues that neither 
Congress nor the drafters of the Act provided a cogent explanation 
for granting a strong form of national, exclusive rights to trademark 
owners while denying a true entitlement to injunctive relief. In-
stead, this ambiguity was most likely a product of the Act’s long, 
haphazard drafting history, coupled with unresolved conflicts re-
garding the basic theory of the legislation. Specifically, rather than 
provide a logical and consistent explanation for how a regime of 
national trademark registration can coexist with geographically li-
mited, state-created common law trademark rights, the Act buried 
the controversy (and placated opposition) by retaining some form 
of ex post judicial discretion to enforce the supposedly ex ante “ex-
clusive” right. 
This Article determines in Part III that the fairest reading of the 
Act and its history is that Congress intended to retain the equitable 
remedial practices in place in trademark cases at the time the Act 
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was passed as a check on national exclusivity given to mark owners. 
A review of those historical practices shows that courts presumed a 
prevailing trademark infringement plaintiff’s entitlement to injunc-
tive relief, because of the tort’s continuing nature and the harms it 
caused to the plaintiff and the public. Courts, moreover, consi-
dered injunctive relief the “usual” remedy in trademark cases at 
the time. The presumption, however, was subject to equitable ba-
lancing, and defenses such as unclean hands or laches. This con-
clusion is consistent with the understanding of general remedies 
scholars who see statutory injunctive authority as a substitute for 
the irreparable harm or adequacy of damages rules, but not as any 
sort of categorical entitlement. 
This Article concludes with the reflection that eBay, more than 
anything else, has revealed anew the Lanham Act’s deep internal 
conflicts—particularly the way in which it sought simultaneously 
to codify the common law of trademarks and create a national ex-
clusive right. The trouble with eBay is another instance of the 
trouble with trademarks generally.5 Ultimately, though, the elabo-
rate balance of presumptions and defenses achieved by the courts 
up until eBay likely comes closest to achieving the Act’s original, if 
murky, vision for statutory injunctions granted “according to the 
principles of equity.”6 
I. EBAY’S TRADEMARK ENIGMA 
A. The eBay “Juggernaut” 
In the spring of 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court shook the pa-
tent world by issuing its terse opinion in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.7 A “categorical” Federal Circuit axiom—that a prevailing 
patent infringement plaintiff was entitled to enjoin, permanently, 
the infringing use of its claimed invention—was suddenly and 
soundly rejected.8 In place of that rule, the Supreme Court insti-
                                                                                                                            
5 Cf. Stephen Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990) (exploring 
inconsistencies between theory of federal trademark law and reality of trademark usage). 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1116. 
7 eBay, 547 U.S. at 390. 
8 Id. at 393–94 (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005)) (discussing the preexisting “general rule”). 
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tuted a test that it controversially characterized as reflecting “tra-
ditional” and “well-established” equitable principals:9 
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must 
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant 
such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it 
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are in-
adequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is war-
ranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.10 
Two concurrences followed the unanimous majority opinion. 
The first, written by Chief Justice Roberts, emphasized that while 
the Court was rejecting the Federal Circuit’s attempt to impose a 
“general rule” entitling plaintiffs to injunctive relief, it still ap-
proved of the historical practice of granting “injunctive relief upon 
a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”11 
The second, by Justice Kennedy, suggested that the Court saw a 
need to give district court judges more remedial discretion in re-
sponse to the newly emergent problem of patent trolls (“firms 
[that] use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”).12 
For reasons that will surely be subject of scholarly debate for 
some time, the eBay four-factor “juggernaut” of a test immediately 
then began its jurisprudential ascent.13 As mapped out by Gergen, 
Golden, and Smith, courts soon extended eBay to cover prelimi-
nary injunctions and rejected any presumptions establishing that a 
party had met any element of the eBay test (such as the irreparable 
harm element).14 Courts expanded their reach to other subject 
                                                                                                                            
9 Id. at 391, 393. 
10 Id. at 391. 
11 Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
12 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
13 Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for 
Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206 (2012). 
14 Id. at 217 (citing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78, 78 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010)); see 
also Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(applying eBay to motion for preliminary injunction just weeks after eBay was issued). 
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areas both within and outside of the intellectual property field.15 
Even state courts welcomed eBay.16 Despite, in short, some fairly 
serious scholarly doubts expressed as to the four-factor test’s prov-
enance,17 internal logic,18 and sense,19 eBay ignited a remedial 
“revolution.”20 
B. eBay’s Trademark Mess in the Federal Courts 
1. The Trademark Injunction Presumption Before eBay 
Prior to eBay, almost all federal appellate courts presumed that 
a trademark plaintiff would be irreparably harmed by continuing 
trademark infringement.21 This rule generally governed both pre-
                                                                                                                            
The conflation of permanent with preliminary injunctive relief practice is particularly 
troubling in the post-eBay case law. In the context of preliminary (as opposed to 
permanent) relief, the irreparable harm and adequacy rules “have an entirely different 
purpose, an entirely different effect, and an entirely different meaning.” DOBBS, supra 
note 1, § 2.5(1), at 127; see infra Section I.B.2.d (discussing this point in the context of 
statutory injunctions). 
15 Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 214–19 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
561 U.S. 139 (2010) (applying eBay to environmental and administrative law); Kartman v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying eBay to a 
diversity-based insurance class action)) (outlining expanding reach of eBay). 
16 Id. at 215 n.51 (citing state cases applying eBay). 
17 Id. at 214 (summarizing four ways in which the eBay test differs from “traditional 
equity: (1) the privileging of the four factors as elements of a canonical test; (2) the 
redundant statement of an irreparable-injury requirement; (3) the formulation of the test 
as a four-pronged one that requires separate establishment of each prong; and (4) the 
potential obliteration of even rebuttable presumptions with respect to satisfaction of any 
of the test’s prongs”). 
18 Id. at 209–12 (detailing how the eBay test is both redundant (in that requirement one 
of irreparable injury is effectively the same as inadequacy of legal remedies) and wrongly 
labeled as factors (in that it establishes the four requirements as prongs of a “test” 
instead of factors in a balancing analysis)). 
19 Id. at 249 (criticizing eBay for varying from “traditional equity” and advocating for a 
return of “the structured sets of presumptions and safety valves that have characterized 
traditional equitable practice [and that] seem more likely than a bare four-factor test to 
combine general predictability, specific flexibility, and targeted effect in a way that 
satisfactorily resolves social concerns across a broad spectrum of fact patterns and legal 
areas”). 
20 Id. at 204 (noting that “[t]he law of equitable remedies is in the midst of an 
American revolution,” and identifying eBay as the cause). 
21 See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726, 732 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction and stating “trademark infringement amounts 
to irreparable injury as a matter of law” (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 
F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992))); Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest. L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 
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liminary and permanent relief.22 As the Third Circuit put it in a 
leading case, “trademark infringement amounts to irreparable in-
jury as a matter of law.”23 
Even, for instance, where an appellate court expressly deferred 
to a district court’s finding that no serious health risk to the public 
                                                                                                                            
129 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “proof of a likelihood of confusion establishes both 
likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm”); Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. 
Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing how a showing of a 
likelihood of confusion establishes irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the 
merits); Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 640, 644 
(1st Cir. 1992) (“By its very nature, trademark infringement results in irreparable harm 
because the attendant loss of profits, goodwill, and reputation cannot be satisfactorily 
quantified and, thus, the trademark owner cannot adequately be compensated. Hence, 
irreparable harm flows from an unlawful trademark infringement as a matter of law.”); 
Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16, 18 (7th Cir. 1992) (reciting the 
“well-established” presumption that injuries under the Lanham Act are irreparable 
because the economic losses of intangible harms (e.g., loss of goodwill and damage to 
reputation) are “virtually impossible” to determine); Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. 
Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991) (adopting the presumption of irreparable harm in 
trademark infringement actions); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 612 
n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that establishing that a likelihood of confusion in trademark 
infringement actions typically presumes that irreparable harm will be suffered if 
injunctive relief is not granted); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 
n.11 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that proving actual damage or injury is not necessary to obtain 
injunctive relief, a plaintiff only needs to prove the likelihood of confusion to establish its 
right to an injunction); E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imps., Inc., 756 
F.2d 1525, 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing presumption and noting that “a 
sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of confusion may by itself constitute a showing 
of . . . a substantial threat of irreparable harm”); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold 
Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that a court may “presume 
irreparable injury from a finding of probable success in proving likelihood of confusion”); 
Marker Int’l v. de Bruler, 635 F. Supp. 986, 998 (D. Utah 1986) (discussing how 
demonstrating a likelihood of confusion entitles a plaintiff to injunctive relief because 
irreparable injury is presumed); see also 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47 (4th ed. 2015) (“The rule followed by 
almost all courts is that irreparable injury is presumed if a likelihood of success on the 
merits of trademark infringement is proven.”). 
22 Compare Kos Pharm., 369 F.3d at 726 (preliminary injunction), with Mutual of 
Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403 n.11 (permanent injunction). 
23 S & R, 968 F.2d at 378. One exception to this trend, discussed infra Section I.B.2.c, 
appears to have been the Fifth Circuit. Although some district courts in that circuit 
occasionally used language suggesting a presumption (see, e.g., Quantum Fitness Corp. v. 
Quantum Lifestyle Ctrs., L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810, 831 (S.D. Tex. 1999)), the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless “avoided ‘expressly adopting this presumption of 
irreparable injury.’” Paulsson Geophysical Servs. Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
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existed from the continuing sale of a cholesterol drug with a name 
confusingly similar to another, it still concluded that the district 
court clearly erred by not preliminarily enjoining use of the infring-
ing mark.24 The lower court failed to consider the public’s right 
“not to be deceived or confused” independently of any right to be 
free from health risks.25 Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not even 
remand for further fact-finding on the issue, but rather instructed 
the lower court to enter an expedited preliminary injunction 
straight away.26 
Many circuits, prior to eBay, further guided their district courts 
to consider injunctive relief as “the remedy of choice for trademark 
and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at 
law for the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringe-
ment.”27 General remedies case books similarly cited trademark 
infringement as a black letter example of a cause of action where 
injunctive relief is “especially important.”28 
                                                                                                                            
24 Kos Pharm., 369 F.3d at 731–32. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(affirming district court’s grant of permanent injunction following summary judgment 
against terminated licensee). Scholars and courts have long debated whether the 
requirement that a plaintiff prove no adequate remedy at law (eBay prong two) is truly 
distinct from the requirement of showing that it would be irreparably harmed but for 
issuance of an injunction (eBay prong one). This can be particularly confusing when faced 
with pre-eBay permanent injunction cases, such as Century 21, which often do not follow 
the eBay analytic framework, but speak only of adequacy of non-injunctive relief, or 
irreparable harm, without discussion of the other factors. Except where otherwise stated, 
this Article will follow the lead of those scholars that consider the two requirements 
interchangeably, being more or less mirror images of each other (i.e., a party with no 
adequate remedy at law will, by definition, be irreparably harmed by the denial of an 
injunction). See Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 209 (“The test’s requirements of (1) 
irreparable injury and (2) inadequacy of legal remedies are redundant as these are, 
traditionally speaking, one and the same.”); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable 
Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990) (“The two formulations are equivalent; 
what makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair it.”). 
28 DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.1(2), at 59; see id. § 2.5(2), at 130 n.1 (listing trademark 
infringement as an example of a case where “injunctions are so routinely given that they 
are sometimes regarded as the normal remedy, to be given irrespective of the adequacy 
test”); id. § 2.9(2), at 228 (noting that trademark infringement is “especially well-
adapted” to injunctive relief); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 938 cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (citing trademark action as an example of a body of law where 
injunctions are granted regularly without case by case articulation). 
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The language in some cases went so far as to suggest that 
trademark infringement didn’t just satisfy one factor of a multi-
factor test (such as irreparable harm), but actually entitled a pre-
vailing plaintiff to an injunction in and of itself. That is, a plaintiff 
could more or less rest its case to enjoin infringing use after de-
monstrating likely confusion with a protected mark: “a court need 
only find that a defendant is liable for infringement or unfair com-
petition for it to award injunctive relief.”29 
Many rationales have been given for the prevailing trademark 
plaintiff’s historic entitlement to either a presumption of irrepara-
ble harm or injunctive relief as such. The most common, often ad-
vanced by Professor McCarthy, suggests that it stems from the 
“inherently” irreparable nature of trademark infringement itself: 
The basis of the presumption is that trademark in-
fringement monetary relief is, in the language of eq-
uity, inherently “inadequate” and injury is “irre-
parable.” By showing a likelihood of success in 
proving a likelihood of confusion, plaintiff also 
shows that . . . it will probably lose control of its 
reputation because this reputation rests upon the 
quality of defendant’s activities as a result of a like-
lihood of confusion of purchasers. Such a likelihood 
of damage to reputation is by its nature “irrepara-
ble.”30 
As shown in his use of terms like “inherently” and “by its na-
ture,” McCarthy’s highly influential view of the presumption is at 
heart categorical and definitional—it is based on what trademark 
infringement is, intrinsically. 
Trademark law, under this view, secures control over a mark to 
one owner so as to avoid confusion to the public and to protect the 
                                                                                                                            
29 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999); see also 
Topps Co. Inc. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL 719381, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1996) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that in trademark infringement 
actions, a finding of likelihood of confusion of a valid trademark between the marks in 
question provides sufficient grounds for issuance of a preliminary injunction, without 
further evidence of actual injury.” (citing Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Compangna per le 
Farmacie in Italia S.p.A, 847 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
30 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:47 (discussing preliminary relief). 
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value of the brand.31 But at heart it is the loss of control over one’s 
reputation, in and of itself, that is the quintessential harm that a 
cause of action for trademark infringement seeks to prevent.32 To 
McCarthy, the regime is set up, prophylactically, to assume that 
unintentionally losing control of one’s reputation to another is per 
se harmful. 
The presumption of irreparable injury in trademark cases was 
also understood to be a specific case of the general remedial rule 
that plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed where damages are diffi-
cult to quantify,33 or where they would have to sue repeatedly for 
successive increments of damage (i.e., to prevent repeating or con-
tinuing infringement).34 Indeed, McCarthy draws on this latter ra-
tionale as support for enjoining future acts of infringement: 
What would happen in a trademark infringement 
case if the court were to hold that damages were 
adequate to remedy the problem of defendant’s con-
tinued acts of confusing customers? If an injunction 
were denied, the court would be telling plaintiff to 
sit by and watch defendant continue to violate the 
law, infringe upon plaintiff’s proven rights and con-
tinue to confuse and deceive customers until such 
time as plaintiff decided to sue again for money 
damages as compensation for the past injury in-
curred. That would not be anything close to an 
“adequate” remedy.35 
                                                                                                                            
31 Cf. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.4(5) at 112 (“[T]he public interest represented by 
customer confusion weighs in favor of an injunction because it represents a cost being 
imposed by defendant’s conduct . . . .”). 
32 Cf. Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1091 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (“[W]e have held that ‘the owner of a mark is damaged by a later use of a 
similar mark which place[s] the owner’s reputation beyond its control, though no loss in 
business is shown.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
33 Laycock, supra note 27, at 713–14 (listing trademark cases as a category of suit where 
damages are difficult to measure which supports a finding of irreparable injury); id. at 714 
n.136; DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.5(2), at 131, 134–35. 
34 Laycock, supra note 27, at 714–15 (“Damages might not deter repeated violations, 
and mounting litigation costs might deter plaintiff from suing before they deterred 
defendant from violating the law.”). 
35 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:2. 
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Although, as just described, the pre-eBay trademark presump-
tion (whether to the irreparable harm factor or injunctive relief in 
general) was powerful and almost universal, it was never absolute 
or automatic.36 It was, that is, just a legal presumption always capa-
ble of being rebutted.37 Evidence that plaintiff delayed in bringing 
suit, for instance, has always been capable of overcoming the pre-
sumption of irreparable harm, particularly in the preliminary in-
junction context.38 
2. The Post-eBay Muddle 
One attempts a taxonomy of disorder at one’s own peril, par-
ticularly when that disorder is shifting in real time. With that said, 
in the wake of eBay the federal circuit courts can be roughly ar-
ranged into four groups with respect to its application to trademark 
law: (i) those that read eBay to bar any use of presumptions in 
                                                                                                                            
36 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement 
Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1 (2009) (“Even if a presumption of 
irreparable injury is triggered, such a presumption can always be rebutted. Where the 
equities have balanced in the defendant’s favor, notwithstanding a showing of some 
confusion, a preliminary injunction has been denied. The traditional rule creates a 
presumption, not an entitlement . . . . As the Second Circuit remarked, the presumption 
of irreparable injury ‘leaves the door slightly ajar perhaps for those few cases in other 
trademark contexts where irreparable harm does not follow.’” (citing Church of 
Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 
1986); Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985); SMJ Group, Inc. v. 
417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))). 
37 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 301 (“In a civil case . . . the party against whom a presumption is 
directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule 
does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it 
originally.”). 
38 See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that delay in 
bringing suit and motion for preliminary injunction “render[s] inoperative any 
presumption”); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting, in the 
preliminary injunction context, that “[d]elay in seeking relief, however, undercuts any 
presumption that infringement alone has caused irreparable harm pendente lite”). Courts 
also regularly deny relief to trademark plaintiffs under the doctrine of unclean hands. See, 
e.g., Worthington v. Anderson, 386 F.3d 1314, 1321–22 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial 
of relief for trademark infringement under doctrine of unclean hands); Federal Folding 
Wall Corp. v. Nat’l Folding Wall Corp., 340 F. Supp. 141, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (denying 
relief under doctrine of unclean hands where representative of trademark infringement 
plaintiff, among other things, breached his contract with defendant and wrongfully caused 
a third party to cancel its trademark license with the defendant). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 
(2012) (establishing that federal court power to grant injunctions against trademark 
infringement is subject “to the principles of equity”). 
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trademark injunction analyses; (ii) those that consider eBay appli-
cable to trademark injunction cases, but remain noncommittal as to 
whether the presumption of irreparable harm might survive in 
some form or another; (iii) those seeming to endorse use of a 
trademark irreparable harm presumption after eBay; and (iv) those 
that have not directly addressed the applicability of eBay to trade-
mark law leaving the district courts to fend for themselves.39 
a) Circuits that Read eBay to Bar any Use of Presumptions 
in Trademark Injunction Analyses (Third and Ninth 
Circuits) 
The Ninth Circuit has clearly led all others in its zeal to extend 
eBay to trademark law. In a 2013 preliminary injunction case, Herb 
Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., it 
relied on eBay and its preliminary injunction analogue, Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,40 to overrule prior 
precedent establishing the presumption of irreparable harm in 
trademark actions.41 As central support for extending eBay to 
trademark law, the court observed that the statutory language in 
both the Patent Act and Lanham Act are worded identically in giv-
ing the district courts power to grant injunctions in accordance 
with “the principles of equity.”42 
Perhaps even more meaningful for trademark plaintiffs, the 
court went on to hold that “likely” and “actual” irreparable harm 
“must be demonstrated,” respectively, to obtain a preliminary and 
permanent injunction.43 Conclusory assertions, it underscored, of 
“loss of control” to the trademark owner and other “platitudes” 
that are “not grounded in any evidence” are insufficient to meet 
                                                                                                                            
39 A final category is those circuits where neither appellate courts nor lower tribunals 
have addressed the issue at all. As of the publication of this Article, those are limited to 
the Federal and D.C. Circuits. 
40 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
41 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 
2013). The court says that it “join[ed]” precedent set by the Eleventh Circuit (in North 
American Medical) and the Sixth Circuit in so holding; however, as described below, the 
cited opinions are far more equivocal on that point then the Ninth Circuit recognizes. Id. 
42 Id. at 1249 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 and 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)). 
43 Id. Although the court expressly first references “copyright infringement” as to the 
preliminary injunction component, it immediately goes on to apply that standard to a 
preliminary trademark injunction. Id. at 1250. 
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this burden.44 Numerous courts have subsequently relied on that 
holding for the principle that the presumption of irreparable harm 
no longer exists in the Ninth Circuit.45 
It is difficult to understand why a prevailing trademark plaintiff 
should be required to show actual harm to receive a permanent in-
junction when the standard for liability has only ever required a 
showing of likely (not actual) confusion.46 When combined with the 
rule that requires a showing of actual confusion to receive mone-
tary damages,47 this means that in the Ninth Circuit a finding of 
liability premised on likely confusion entitles you to no relief at all. 
Following the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit also extended 
eBay and Winter to the Lanham Act, and overruled prior cases that 
had allowed for a presumption of irreparable harm.48 Although aris-
ing in a false advertising context, the expansive discussion within 
the opinion, and later cases, make clear that the court meant for it 
to apply with equal force to Lanham Act trademark infringement 
cases.49 
                                                                                                                            
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., San Miguel Pure Foods Co. v. Ramar Int’l Corp., No. 13-55537, 2015 WL 
5042914, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2015) (reversing grant of permanent injunction to 
prevailing trademark infringement plaintiff because it was error to presume irreparable 
harm, and such harm “may not be based on speculative injury”); Haas Automation, Inc. 
v. Denny, No. 2:12-CV-04779 (CBM) (PLAx), 2014 WL 2966989, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 
2014) (denying injunction for lack of evidence of irreparable harm; refusing to presume 
irreparable harm from likely confusion alone); AFD China Intellectual Prop. Law (USA) 
Office, Inc. v. AFD China Intellectual Prop. Law Office, No. 3:09-cv-1509-BR, 2014 WL 
2619644, at *6 (D. Or. June 12, 2014) (denying permanent injunctive relief to prevailing 
trademark plaintiff unable to show “actual” irreparable harm); OTR Wheel Eng’g, Inc. v. 
W. Worldwide Servs., No. CV-14-085-LRS, 2014 WL 1922744, at *4 (E.D. Wash. May 
14, 2014) (refusing to apply a presumption, but still finding likelihood of irreparable harm 
in trade dress infringement action). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have even extended Herb 
Reed to serial cybersquatting cases. See Shutterstock, Inc. v. Pikulski, No. 14CV869 
WQH-NLS, 2014 WL 2154266, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2014) (denying motion for 
preliminary injunction where plaintiff failed to show likely irreparable injury regardless of 
its likelihood of success on the merits against serial typosquatter). 
46 See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
47 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
48 Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 
49 Id. (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s extension of the eBay analysis to a trademark 
infringement claim is “[c]onsistent with our holding”); accord Arrowpoint Capital Corp. 
v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-3063, 2015 WL 4366571, at *8 n.15 (3d Cir. 
2015) (rejecting, in dicta, party’s assertion that actual confusion can still create a 
presumption of irreparable harm, and citing Ferring Pharmaceuticals for rule that a party is 
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b) Noncommittal or Equivocating Circuits (First, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits) 
Appellate courts in the First, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits 
agree that eBay’s balancing test applies to trademark injunction 
practice, however these courts hedge as to what that means for the 
presumption of irreparable harm. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach in North American Medical 
Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc. fully reveals this tension. The court 
expressly concluded that eBay, despite being a patent case, was 
“applicable” to the trademark infringement preliminary injunction 
motion before it.50 Contrary though to the understanding of the 
Ninth Circuit, which claimed to “join” the Eleventh when it went 
on to abrogate the presumption of irreparable harm,51 the court in 
North American Medical actually refused to extend its holding that 
far.52 Rather, twice using the unfortunately vague and discretionary 
term “may well,” it remanded to the district court to determine 
how eBay ought to apply under the facts of the case before it: 
[T]he district court may well conclude on remand 
that it can readily reach an appropriate decision by 
fully applying eBay without the benefit of a pre-
sumption of irreparable injury, or it may well decide 
that the particular circumstances of the instant case 
bear substantial parallels to previous cases such that 
a presumption of irreparable injury is an appropriate 
                                                                                                                            
not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when bringing a motion for preliminary 
injunction in a trademark infringement suit); Broadcase Music, Inc. v. Publick House 
Partners, LLC, No. 13-03326 (WHW)(CLW). 2015 WL 3396804, at *4 (D.N.J. May 26, 
2015) (noting, in a copyright infringement dispute, that Ferring Pharmaceuticals concerned 
“trademark infringement cases”). Interestingly, however, at least one subsequent district 
court opinion in the Third Circuit considering an injunction for trademark infringement 
seems to have been unaware of Ferring Pharmaceuticals, because it continued to assert that 
“[t]rademark infringement constitutes an irreparable injury as a matter of law.” Ramada 
Worldwide, Inc. v. Van Horn Hosp., LLC, No. 13-7105, 2015 WL 150090, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 12, 2015). 
50 N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008). 
51 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013). 
52 N. Am. Med., 522 F.3d at 1228 (“[W]e decline to address whether such a 
presumption is the equivalent of the categorical rules rejected by the Court in eBay.”). 
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exercise of its discretion in light of the historical 
traditions.53 
Later courts, not surprisingly, have puzzled over the exact 
meaning of this command. Many district courts have taken it to 
mean that a district court in that circuit is “permitted” to presume 
irreparable harm, or not, at its discretion.54 Others understand the 
case effectively to have endorsed continuing use of an irreparable 
harm presumption after eBay, so long as that presumption is not 
used in a “categorical” approach.55 In a recent per curium deci-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit went so far as to opine that, even after 
North American Medical and eBay, a showing of confusion still “or-
dinarily warrants injunctive relief,” and reversed a district court 
that had denied preliminary injunctive relief on a trademark in-
fringement claim.56 
The true divergence from the Ninth Circuit’s absolute ap-
proach is starkly revealed in another case involving “The Platters” 
trademark.57 A district court in Florida, in evaluating plaintiff Herb 
Reed’s request for a preliminary injunction against defendant vocal 
group’s use of a variant of that mark, first stated its understanding 
that North American Medical left the Eleventh Circuit’s “prior 
                                                                                                                            
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Nane Jan, LLC v. Seasalt & Pepper, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-208-FtM-29CM, 
2014 WL 5177655, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2014); Adidas AG v. adidas2013online.com, 
No. 13-24398-CIV, 2013 WL 6667043, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2013) (noting that under 
North American Medical, a court is “permitted” to presume irreparable injury or 
alternatively may proceed without its benefit, but here choosing not to rely on the 
presumption); see also Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that in a false advertising case, because the district court did not rely on a 
presumption of irreparable harm, there was no need to decide whether this presumption 
is still valid). 
55 Commodores Entm’t Corp. v. McClary, No. 6:14-cv-1335-Orl-37GJK, 2014 WL 
5285980, at *4 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014) (presumption survives eBay in Eleventh 
Circuit); Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v. Casa Los Martinez Corp., No. 1:14-cv-22859-JAL, 
2014 WL 4948632, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit 
“subscribe[s] to the rule that infringement of a trademark is, by its very nature, an activity 
which causes irreparable harm”). 
56 Boulan South Beach Master Ass’n, Inc. v. Think Properties, LLC, No. 14-15616, 
2015 WL 3542100, at *2 (11th Cir. June 8, 2015) (per curiam). 
57 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. World Famous Platters Rd. Shows I LLC, No. 8:14-cv-
56-T-17AEP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22046, at *12–13 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2014) (declining 
to resolve whether the presumption is still valid in light of eBay and choosing not to apply 
it where plaintiff had established irreparable injury in any event). 
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precedent intact” and allowed it to presume irreparable harm.58 
Nevertheless, it did not need to do so because plaintiff adequately 
demonstrated irreparable injury by showing that defendants were 
using its mark and that such use “could potentially impact plain-
tiff’s reputation and goodwill.”59 In short, in a case brought by the 
same plaintiff and involving the same mark at issue in the Ninth 
Circuit’s Herb Reed, a court in the Eleventh Circuit traversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s rule both by declaring the continued vitality of the 
presumption and by finding irreparable harm based on conclusory 
assertions of loss of goodwill and harm to reputation. 
The First Circuit has followed a similar trajectory to the Ele-
venth, though omitting the problematic discretionary language 
used by the latter. It has clearly held that eBay’s “traditional equit-
able principals” apply to trademark cases.60 Although it further 
opined that the case possibly “called into question” the longstand-
ing presumption of irreparable harm, it expressly declined to rule 
on whether the presumption might nevertheless survive eBay in 
some form.61 The court went on to pose this same question three 
separate times, without deciding it, in later cases.62 
District courts in the First Circuit have split on the application 
of the presumption.63 A number cite the eBay factors but then go on 
to apply the old presumption, either in the alternative or to satisfy 
                                                                                                                            
58 Id. 
59 Id. at *13–14. 
60 Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31–34 
(1st Cir. 2011) (noting that “we see no principled reason why [eBay] should not apply in 
the present case,” and denying injunction where plaintiff delayed excessively in bringing 
suit). 
61 Id. (“[W]e decline to decide whether the aforementioned presumption is analogous 
to the ‘general’ or ‘categorical’ rules rejected by the Supreme Court in eBay.”). 
62 See, e.g., Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. #19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir. 
2013); Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 9 n.11 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“We reiterate here that there is a looming question as to whether this presumption can 
co-exist with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in [eBay].”); Mercado-Salinas v. Bart 
Enters. Int’l, 671 F.3d 12, 19 n.7 (1st Cir. 2011). 
63 165 Park Row, Inc. v. JHR Dev., LLC, No. 2:12-cv-00106-NT, 2014 WL 442554, at 
*4–5 (D. Me. Feb. 4, 2014) (performing alternative analyses both if the presumption still 
exists and in the event that it no longer does); Vinyl Technologies, Inc. v. Laser 
Mechanisms, Inc., No. CIV.A.13-40017-TSH, 2013 WL 1947165, at *2 n.3 (D. Mass. May 
9, 2013) (noting possibility that presumption no longer survives in First Circuit). 
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the irreparable harm prong.64 Others note the tension between the 
presumption and eBay and opt to perform a separate analysis for 
irreparable harm, often based on general assertions of damage to 
goodwill and reputation, rather than apply the presumption.65 One 
particularly uncertain court, after an analysis of the tension, noted 
that it could “comfortably extend the holding” of eBay to the case 
but then went on to apply the presumption.66 Others apply eBay 
with no mention of any presumption or discussion of its validity.67 
Yet others still apply it, expressly rejecting the idea that eBay im-
pacted the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases.68 
Similar to the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit heard arguments 
that a “prima facie case of trademark infringement establishes irre-
parable harm, per se” just one year after eBay was decided; howev-
er, the court declined to address eBay’s impact on the presumption 
as unnecessary for disposition of the case.69 Without clear appellate 
precedent supporting or overruling the presumption, the district 
courts in the Tenth Circuit have published decisions tracking the 
outcomes in the First Circuit. One district court applied the pre-
sumption, determining that eBay was distinguishable from trade-
mark cases.70 Others list the equitable factors from eBay and apply 
                                                                                                                            
64 165 Park Row, 2014 WL 442554, at *4–5 (performing an eBay analysis); Ne. Lumber 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. N. States Pallet Co., No. 09-cv-290-LM, 2011 WL 320619, at *3–4 
(D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2011) (citing eBay for the four factors considered in granting a permanent 
injunction, but applying presumption for irreparable harm factor). 
65 Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance, Inc. v. Bumper2Bumper, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00258-
NT, 2012 WL 4753407, at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 4, 2012); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. 
LLC v. ABM Donuts, Inc., No. CA 11-270 S, 2011 WL 6026129, at *6–7 (D.R.I. Oct. 4, 
2011) (finding irreparable injury regardless of whether presumption still applies). 
66 Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Wometco Donas Inc., No. 14-10162-
NMG, 2014 WL 4542956, at *7–8 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2014). 
67 Greene v. Ablon, No. 09-10937-DJC, 2013 WL 4714344, at *2–3 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 
2013). 
68 Operation ABLE of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 
2d 166, 176–77 (D. Mass. 2009) (limiting eBay to “permanent injunctions issued under 
the Patent Act” and noting that the First Circuit has not indicated that the presumption 
does not apply in trademark cases). 
69 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 213 Fed. App’x 654, 655–57 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(declining to consider how eBay affects the trademark irreparable harm presumption). 
70 Basis Int’l Ltd. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310, 1310 n.5 
(D.N.M. 2011) (noting that eBay does not change the presumption of irreparable harm 
because unlike patent cases, “trademark cases involve intangibles like the trademark 
owner’s reputation and goodwill”). 
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the presumption of irreparable harm, without discussing its contin-
uing validity.71 Some dodge the question by deciding that regardless 
of its validity, plaintiff met its burden to show irreparable harm.72 
Other district courts decline to apply it in light of eBay.73 
c) Circuits Endorsing Use of a Presumption After eBay 
(Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) 
Neither the Fourth, Fifth, nor Sixth Circuit has issued an opi-
nion directly analyzing and affirming the propriety of a presump-
tion of irreparable harm in trademark cases following eBay. Yet, in 
different ways, each has given some form of approval to its contin-
ued application. 
Of all the Circuits, the Sixth comes closest to preserving, after 
eBay, a rule of law that presumes irreparable harm to flow from a 
finding of likely confusion. In three separate opinions subsequent 
to eBay the Sixth Circuit has relied upon the presumption or its 
equivalent to find irreparable harm to support a plaintiff’s entitle-
ment to injunctive relief against a trademark infringer.74 In one 
                                                                                                                            
71 See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Med. Prods., No. 1:10-cv-00207-DN, 2012 
WL 3962737, at *4–5 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2012) (listing the four equitable factors from eBay 
and stating that trademark infringement carries a presumption of irreparable harm). 
72 See, e.g., IHOP Franchising, LLC v. Tabel, No. 13-2641-KHV-TJJ, 2014 WL 
1767199, at *11 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2014) (noting open question as to continuing validity of 
the presumption of irreparable injury, and holding that in any event Plaintiffs had 
presented sufficient evidence of irreparable harm, even without the presumption); Steak 
n Shake Enters., Inc v. Globex Co., No. 13-cv-01751-RM-CBS, 2013 WL 4718757, at *14 
(D. Colo. Sept. 3, 2013). 
73 See, e.g., As Am. As Doughnuts, Inc. v. Patton, Nos. 2:10-cv-1138 CW, 2:11-cv-241 
CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135758, at *3 (D. Utah Nov. 22, 2011) (stating, after eBay, 
that trademark “infringement alone is not irreparable harm”); Greenway Univ., Inc. v. 
Greenway of Ariz., LLC, No. 11-cv-01055-CMA-KLM, 2011 WL 2669174, at *5–6 (D. 
Colo. July 7, 2011) (declining to apply a presumption of irreparable injury in light of eBay). 
74 See, e.g., CFE Racing Prods., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 2015 WL 4174649, at *18 
(6th Cir. July 13, 2015) (observing that irreparable harm exists in a trademark case where a 
party shows that it will lose control of its reputation; remanding to district court to 
increase scope of injunction); Lucky’s Detroit, LLC v. Double L, Inc., 533 F. App’x 553, 
555, 560 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming grant of permanent injunction, and concluding that 
“there is sufficient evidence that customers will be confused by both parties’ use of the 
marks, and thus Double L made a sufficient showing that it would suffer irreparable harm 
if LD continues to use the mark”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 
453 F.3d 377, 381–82 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating just two weeks after eBay that “our Circuit 
requires no particular finding of its likelihood [of irreparable harm] to support injunctive 
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case, in the very next sentence after recitation of the eBay factors 
the Court cites to the leading pre-eBay presumption case in the 
Sixth Circuit, stating, “In trademark infringement cases, a likelih-
ood of confusion or possible risk to the requesting party’s reputa-
tion satisfies the irreparable injury requirement.”75 
District courts within the Sixth Circuit seem by and large to 
have gotten the message that the presumption of irreparable harm 
remains alive and well there. These courts generally cite to the 
eBay factors for the overall test used to determine the propriety of 
injunctive relief, and then proceed to find the irreparable injury 
element presumptively satisfied by trademark infringement itself.76 
One court, after remarking that the Sixth Circuit does not require a 
showing of irreparable harm to support injunctive relief in trade-
mark cases, supported the irreparable harm element with other 
evidence in any event.77 In two cases, the defendants had argued 
that eBay necessitated disposing of the presumption in trademark 
cases; in both, the courts did not rule on the continued vitality of 
                                                                                                                            
relief in cases of this type, for ‘irreparable injury “ordinarily follows when a likelihood of 
confusion or possible risk to reputation appears” from infringement or unfair 
competition’”). 
75 Lucky’s, 533 F. App’x at 555 (citing Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 
595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991)). Two other cases from the Sixth Circuit are consistent with use 
of presumptions in finding irreparable harm, but remain more or less silent on the issue. 
See L.F.P.IP, LLC v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., 533 F. App’x 615, 621 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(citing eBay factors and stating without elaboration that “[t]he district court’s injunction 
appropriately enjoined Jimmy’s practice of willfully infringing Larry’s trademarks and 
protected the public from confusion arising from his use of the marks”); Audi AG v. 
D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing eBay factors and holding that 
irreparable injury flows from consumers purchasing counterfeit goods). 
76 See, e.g., Boost Worldwide, Inc. v. Cell Station Wireless, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-490, 
2014 WL 47977, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2014) (granting permanent injunction in 
trademark infringement action, and finding eBay’s irreparable injury requirement satisfied 
under pre-eBay presumption); Elcometer, Inc. v. TQC-USA, Inc., No. 12-CV-14628, 
2013 WL 5346382, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2013) (granting permanent injunction in 
trademark infringement action and finding eBay’s irreparable injury requirement satisfied 
by un-rebutted allegation that “unauthorized use of [plaintiff’s] trademark has resulted in 
irreparable injury to [plaintiff] and the goodwill associated with its trademark”). 
77 End Prod. Results, LLC v. Dental USA, Inc., No. 12-11546, 2014 WL 897363, at *6 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2014) (citing Lorillard Tobacco for proposition that Sixth Circuit does 
not require irreparable harm to support injunctive relief, and alternatively reciting 
evidence of potential lost sales and customers as support for irreparable harm). 
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the presumption, but instead found or failed to find irreparable 
harm on other grounds.78 
The Fourth Circuit, for its part, issued indirect support of the 
application of the presumption in reviewing the opinion of a district 
court that had cited the four-factor test from eBay, but also had 
clearly applied the presumption to satisfy the irreparable harm 
prong of that test.79 The majority vacated the injunction, but solely 
in order to limit its scope to the Fourth Circuit under principals of 
comity.80 A concurring and dissenting judge on the panel (who 
would have left the injunction in place nationally) observed that the 
district court applied the “proper legal test” under eBay, a point 
which that judge understood not to be challenged by the majority 
opinion.81 
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have split on the continued 
viability of the presumption. A number still apply it, usually to sa-
tisfy the irreparable harm prong of the eBay test.82 Some note a ten-
sion caused by eBay, but apply the presumption anyways.83 Others 
                                                                                                                            
78 Pond Guy, Inc. v. Aquascape Designs, Inc., No. 13-13229, 2014 WL 2863871, at *13 
(E.D. Mich. June 24, 2014) (denying motion for preliminary injunction due to no 
likelihood of confusion, and mentioning without deciding defendant’s argument that eBay 
rejected the presumption of irreparable harm). 
79 Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Von Drehle Corp., No. 5:05-CV-478-BO, 
2013 WL 3923984, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 29, 2013) (presuming irreparable injury upon 
showing of confusion), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 781 F.3d 710, 717 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(vacating injunction solely to limit its geographical reach under comity principals). 
80 Georgia-Pacific, 781 F.3d at 717. 
81 Id. at 727–28 (Shedd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The same judge 
also approvingly cited the pre-eBay case Lone Star Steakhouse, a leading pro-trademark 
presumption case in that circuit, asserting that “[w]hen trademark infringement has been 
proven, ‘an injunction is the preferred remedy to insure that future violations will not 
occur.’” Id. at 727 (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 
F.3d 922, 939 (4th Cir. 1995)). The circuit’s only other consideration of eBay in the 
context of the Lanham Act involved a false advertising case. See PBM Prods., LLC v. 
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 126–27 (4th Cir. 2011). 
82 Djarum v. Dhanraj Imports, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (citing 
eBay, but applying presumption to satisfy irreparable injury prong); see also Meineke Car 
Care Centers, LLC v. ASAR Inc., No. 3:14-CV-129-RJC, 2014 WL 3952491, at *4 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2014); Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc. v. Portfolio Recovery 
Grp., LLC, No. 2:12CV649, 2013 WL 5723869, at *10 (E.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2013) (noting 
that “irreparable injury regularly follows from trademark infringement” (quoting Lone 
Star Steakhouse, 43 F.3d at 939)). 
83 See, e.g., Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp, No. 1:13-CV-214, 
2014 WL 3615853, at *12 (E.D.Va. July 18, 2014) (noting that eBay might call the 
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cite eBay and eschew mention of a presumption, but nonetheless 
engage in a short-cut analysis using the fact of likely confusion and 
potential harm to reputation to meet the irreparable injury re-
quirement.84 
The Fifth Circuit poses particular challenges. On the one hand, 
the circuit has observed that it “avoided expressly adopting” any 
presumption of irreparable harm even prior to eBay.85 Under that 
logic, one would assume that the circuit would fall in line rather 
easily with those that have abrogated the presumption. Instead, 
however, the one appellate court to directly rule on the issue, in 
Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, actually cited eBay but then endorsed 
the pre-eBay position of Professor McCarthy: “All that must be 
proven to establish liability and the need for an injunction against 
infringement is the likelihood of confusion—injury is presumed.”86 
Although the case involved an admittedly esoteric issue of the bur-
den of proving entitlement to a trademark injunction when faced 
with a strong laches defense, it still seems fair to conclude that the 
Fifth Circuit amazingly went from having no presumption of irre-
parable harm in trademark infringement actions prior to eBay to 
adopting a presumption that likely confusion is injurious after it.87 
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have struggled with how to 
adopt the circuit court’s guidance. Some have read the Abraham 
case to limit eBay’s ban on presumptions to patent actions, and in-
stead to adopt a rule that a showing of likely confusion allows a 
plaintiff to presume irreparable injury for purposes of meeting the 
                                                                                                                            
presumption into question, but observing that courts in the Fourth Circuit have 
continued generally to find irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of confusion). 
84 Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc. v. Singh, No. WDQ-13-2365, 2014 WL 3810524, at *10 (D. Md. 
July 31, 2014) (finding irreparable harm from continued use of mark by holdover licensee 
without relying on a presumption); Legacy Inv. & Mgmt., LLC v. Susquehanna Bank, No. 
CIV. WDQ-12-2877, 2014 WL 836077, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2014) (noting that 
irreparable injury regularly flows from trademark infringement, and citing Lone Star 
Steakhouse but not citing a presumption). 
85 Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining 
to address whether a presumption should be allowed after eBay where the facts supported 
a finding of irreparable harm regardless). 
86 Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 5 
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:2). 
87 Abraham, 708 F.3d at 626–27. 
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first prong of the eBay test.88 Others approach the issue a bit more 
cautiously by applying a presumption in effect without actually us-
ing the term.89 One court reached in the other direction, and re-
fused to apply any presumption under the Fifth Circuit’s earlier 
statement that it intentionally avoided doing so.90 Still others note 
the existence of the presumption, but find no irreparable harm for 
other reasons or support the finding of irreparable harm with other 
evidence.91 
d) Circuits that Have Not Directly Addressed the 
Applicability of eBay to Trademark Law but Where 
District Courts Have Attempted to Do So (Second, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits) 
Neither the Second, Seventh, nor Eighth Circuit has directly 
addressed eBay’s application to trademark law. Of these three, the 
Second Circuit has come closest to doing so, in a leading copyright 
preliminary injunction opinion Salinger v. Colting, penned by Judge 
Calabresi.92 There the court observed, in dicta, that it could “see 
no reason” why eBay’s “central lesson” (i.e., that a court deciding 
                                                                                                                            
88 S. Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., No. CIV.A. 06-9170, 2014 WL 
1652436, at *9 (E.D. La. Apr. 24, 2014) (presuming irreparable harm from showing of 
likelihood of confusion); see also Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
CIV.A. 4:14-0941, 2015 WL 1034254, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) (“The Fifth 
Circuit has signaled that presumptions of irreparable injury are still appropriate following 
the Supreme Court’s eBay decision.”). 
89 Namer v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. CIV.A. 12-2232, 2014 WL 5780539, at *19 
(E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2014) (granting injunctive relief as “usual and standard remedy once 
trademark infringement has been found” without using the term presumption after citing 
eBay); Christus Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Am. Consultants RX, Inc., No. SA:12-CV-1221-
DAE, 2014 WL 1092096, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2014) (recognizing that in the Fifth 
Circuit injuries to reputation and goodwill are considered irreparable, but avoiding use of 
the term “presumption” after citing eBay). 
90 Premiere Hot Tubs, Inc. v. A-Tex Family Fun Ctr., Inc., No. A-12-CA-824-SS, 2014 
WL 1666341, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2014) (finding no irreparable injury, and denying 
injunction, despite proof of underlying infringement). 
91 Reservoir, Inc. v. Truesdell, 1 F. Supp. 3d 598, 616–17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2014) 
(finding no irreparable harm despite presumption where defendants had voluntarily 
ceased use of the plaintiff’s marks); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 
680 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that “likelihood of confusion can constitute irreparable 
harm in a trademark case,” but engaging in independent analysis of irreparable harm in 
counterfeiting action). 
92 607 F.3d 68, 78–80 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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whether to issue an injunction must not “presume that a party has 
met an element of the injunction standard”) would “not apply with 
equal force to an injunction in any type of case.”93 Nevertheless, 
successor panels have resisted fully adopting this position in 
trademark cases where not necessary for the holding.94 
The lack of direct appellate guidance has not prevented district 
courts in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits from staking 
out a range of (often contradictory) positions on the applicability of 
eBay to trademark law. In the Second Circuit, many lower courts 
understand the (non-binding) Salinger opinion effectively to prohi-
bit the use of presumptions of irreparable harm in trademark in-
junction practice.95 Some courts, citing to Salinger and eBay for the 
rule that irreparable injury cannot be presumed, work around this 
by stating (contrary to the Ninth Circuit view) that showing a loss 
of control over the reputation of a mark can establish irreparable 
injury.96 Some note that Salinger and eBay call into question the 
                                                                                                                            
93 Id. at 78 n.7. In Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that, 
although eBay was a case about patents rather than copyrights and about permanent 
rather than preliminary injunctions, it was persuaded by Flexible Lifeline Systems, Inc. v. 
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995–96, 998 (9th Cir. 2011), and Salinger v. Colting, 607 
F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010), that eBay governs a motion for a preliminary injunction in a 
copyright case, as well. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012). 
94 Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895–97 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(citing Salinger standard in breach of trademark license suit and affirming finding of 
irreparable harm based on underlying facts without discussion of a presumption); U.S. 
Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 511 F. App’x 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining 
to decide whether a presumption of irreparable harm can apply after eBay in a trademark 
infringement context where district court found irreparable harm without applying a 
presumption). 
95 See, e.g., Ann Clark, Ltd. v. R&M Int’l, Corp., No. 1:14-CV-143, 2014 WL 7392026, 
at *3 (D. Vt. Dec. 29, 2014) (“The presumption of irreparable injury when likelihood of 
confusion is shown is no longer in effect after Salinger.” (quoting Marks Org., Inc. v. 
Joles, 784 F. Supp. 2d 322, 334 (S.D.N.Y.2011))); Balady, Inc. v. Elhindi, No. 14 CV 855 
SJ RER, 2014 WL 7342867, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (“[F]ollowing Salinger, 
courts have found that ‘th[is] presumption of irreparable injury in trademark cases is no 
longer appropriate.’” (quoting U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 515, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))); Krevat v. Burgers to Go, Inc., No. 13-CV-6258 JS 
AKT, 2014 WL 4638844, at *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (citing Salinger for rule 
that irreparable harm may no longer be presumed in a trademark infringement action, and 
finding irreparable harm on the facts of the case); Mister Softee, Inc. v. Tsirkos, No. 14 
CIV. 1975 LTS RLE, 2014 WL 2535114, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014). 
96 See, e.g., NYP Holdings v. New York Post Pub. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 328, 341 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“‘[I]rreparable harm exists in a trademark case when the party seeking 
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presumption’s continuing vitality, but establish irreparable harm 
with other evidence in the record.97 It appears that the majority of 
district courts in the Second Circuit, however, are still applying the 
presumption without regard to any tension created by eBay or Sa-
linger.98 One court went so far as to cite the Salinger case for the 
proposition that eBay applies with equal force to trademark cases, 
but then immediately went on to observe that irreparable harm “is 
automatically satisfied by [plaintiff] prevailing on its trademark 
claim.”99 
In the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, many district courts refer-
ence and analyze the four factors from the eBay decision, but nev-
ertheless apply the presumption of irreparable harm without ad-
dressing its validity.100 Some apply the four-factor test from eBay 
                                                                                                                            
the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its 
trademark . . . because loss of control over one’s reputation is neither “calculable nor 
precisely compensable.”’ Thus, it will often be the case that a party’s demonstration of a 
likelihood of success on a trademark claim will also show a threat of irreparable harm.” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Mrs. U.S. Nat’l Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org., 
LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226–27 (W.D.N.Y. 2012))); Mitchell Grp. USA LLC v. Nkem 
Udeh, No. 14-cv-5745, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143001, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2007) 
(reading Salinger to bar presumptions of irreparable harm, but nevertheless finding 
irreparable harm in counterfeiting action from loss of control over reputation). 
97 See, e.g., Barefoot Contessa Pantry, LLC v. Aqua Star (USA) Co., No. 15-CV-1092 
JMF, 2015 WL 845711, at *3, *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2015) (observing, without 
deciding, open question as to eBay’s applicability to trademark presumptions after 
Salinger, and relying on, inter alia, evidence of overlapping markets to find irreparable 
harm). 
98 See, e.g., Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., No. 12 CIV.6065 PAE, 2015 WL 
736029, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2015) (citing Salinger but presuming irreparable injury 
for trademark infringement based on jury findings of likelihood of consumer confusion); 
Lavatec Laundry Tech., GmbH v. Lavatec, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-56 SRU, 2014 WL 6633047, 
at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2014) (finding irreparable injury established by showing a 
likelihood of confusion); Boost Worldwide, Inc. v. Talk Til U Drop Wireless, Inc., No. 
5:14-CV-86 MAD/TWD, 2014 WL 5026777, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2014) (likelihood of 
consumer confusion sufficient to establish irreparable harm); optionsXpress, Inc. v. 
optionsXpress Inc., No. 14-CV-956 PKC, 2014 WL 3728637, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 
2014); Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 193, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (noting that the court may presume irreparable harm, and a plaintiff need not prove 
it separately, when a likelihood of confusion has been established). 
99 Electrolux Home Prods., Inc. v. BuyRite Appliances, LLC, No. 14-CV-2461 ILG 
SMG, 2014 WL 5140327, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014) (emphasis added). 
100 See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. 3D Designers Inspirations, No. 4:11-cv-04092-SLD-JEH, 
2014 WL 4901683, at *4, *6 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (listing eBay factors and finding 
irreparable injury prong satisfied because trademark infringement harms “are by their 
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without mention of presumptions, instead citing potential harm to 
goodwill or loss of control of the trademark as evidence of irrepara-
ble harm.101 Others cite to the presumption of irreparable harm, 
question its continuing vitality after eBay, but cautiously proceed to 
find irreparable harm from that same potential harm to goodwill 
and loss of control over the mark (seemingly using the presumption 
as a finger on the scale for plaintiff even if technically no longer 
good law).102 Still others register serious doubts as to presump-
tion’s force after eBay, but hold for defendant on other grounds 
(e.g., due to delay in bringing suit, balance of the harms in defen-
dant’s favor, and other factors).103 Many district courts simply pre-
                                                                                                                            
very nature irreparable and not susceptible of adequate measurement for remedy at law” 
(quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th 
Cir.1982))); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., No. 11-C-861, 2014 WL 
4267445, at *18–19 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2014) (listing eBay factors and applying “well 
settled” presumption that Lanham Act violations are presumed irreparable); Epic Sys. 
Corp. v. Silver, No. 13-CV-355-WMC, 2014 WL 2694051, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 
2014) (listing eBay factors, applying presumption of irreparable harm, and further 
concluding that other eBay factors are met by infringement alone). 
101 See, e.g., C&N Corp. v. Kane, No. 12-C-0257, 2013 WL 6001074, at *2 (E.D. Wis. 
Nov. 12, 2013) (analyzing injunction under eBay factors and finding irreparable injury 
from damage to goodwill and loss of control of trademark without express mention of a 
presumption); Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 880–81 (D. 
Minn. 2010); Am. Taxi Dispatch, Inc. v. Am. Metro Taxi & Limo Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 
999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
102 See, e.g., Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc. v. Brown Health Relaxation Station LLC, No. 13-C-
575, 2014 WL 1818154, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014) (“While that presumption may 
no longer be valid, the difficulty in assessing the damages associated with the harm to 
Zeltiq’s reputation and loss of goodwill supports a finding that Zeltiq has sustained 
irreparable harm.”); Buffalo Wild Wings Int’l, Inc. v. Grand Canyon Equity, LLC, 829 F. 
Supp. 2d 836, 845–46 & n.6 (D. Minn. 2011) (questioning presumption after eBay and 
granting motion for preliminary injunction based on assertions of loss of control in 
holdover franchisee context); Gold’s Gym Licensing, LLC v. K-Pro Mktg. Grp., Inc., No. 
09-CV-1211 (PJS/RLE), 2009 WL 2253247, at *2–3 (D. Minn. July 28, 2009) 
(questioning presumption, but ultimately applying it because (1) trademarks represent a 
type of intangible asset, the loss of which can create irreparable harm, and (2) the 
defendant failed to oppose the motion and argue that no presumption should apply). 
103 See, e.g., Plasti Dip Int’l Inc. v. Rust-Oleum Brands Co., No. 14-1831 (JRT/SER), 
2014 WL 7183789, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2014) (finding persuasive the Third and 
Ninth Circuit view that eBay overrode the presumption of irreparable harm but not 
reaching such a holding, and denying motion for preliminary injunction on other grounds 
including as balance of harms favoring defendant); Real-Time Reporters. P.C. v. Sonntag 
Reporting Servs., No. 13 C 5348, 2013 WL 5818460, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2013) 
(questioning whether the presumption or irreparable harm is valid in light of eBay, but 
finding the point moot because plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit would overcome the 
2016] TRADEMARK’S EBAY PROBLEM 651 
 
sume irreparable harm without mention of eBay.104 One court cited 
eBay for the principal that patentees can no longer presume irre-
parable harm from showing a likelihood of success on the merits, 
but then went on to indicate (in dicta and without other explana-
tion) that a showing of likely confusion would still entitle a trade-
mark plaintiff to a presumption of irreparable harm.105 
e) The Empirical Evidence Reveals No Decrease in 
Trademark Injunction Win Rates After eBay 
Perhaps not surprising considering all the doctrinal confusion it 
has created, the empirical evidence suggests that trademark injunc-
tion win rates at the federal district courts do not conform to pre-
dictable patterns after eBay. One might have hypothesized, for in-
stance, that both preliminary and permanent trademark injunction 
win rates would decline after courts had enough time to assimilate 
eBay into trademark law. After all, while some courts have rejected 
eBay as inapplicable to trademark law, those courts should not real-
ly experience any shift in trademark injunction grant rates. They 
essentially kept pre-eBay case law in place. Others, however, have 
adopted it, which should doctrinally make injunctions more diffi-
cult to attain in those regions. Putting this all together, it would 
suggest at least some downward pressure nationally on trademark 
injunction win rates. 
But the data hardly bear that out. If anything, in fact, trademark 
injunction win rates for prevailing, classic trademark infringement 
plaintiffs have increased slightly overall in the post-eBay world. In 
particular, while win rates for prevailing trademark infringement 
                                                                                                                            
presumption regardless); City Cycle IP, LLC v. Caztek, Inc., No. 12-1285 (JNE/SER), 
2012 WL 3656443, at *3–4 n.6 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2012) (acknowledging that it is not 
clear whether a presumption of irreparable harm from trademark infringement still exists 
after eBay, but denying motion for preliminary injunction where defendants had already 
ceased use of accused infringing marks). 
104 See, e.g., George & Co., LLC v. Xavier Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 09-2973, 2009 WL 
4730331, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2009) (presuming irreparable harm on trademark-
infringement claim where plaintiffs demonstrated a showing of likelihood of confusion); J 
& B Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Redux Beverages, LLC, 621 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (D. 
Minn. 2007). 
105 Medtronic, Inc. v. Brasseler USA, Inc., No. 13 C 5348, 2011 WL 4899980, at *3–4 
(D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2011) (denying presumption of irreparable harm for trademark 
infringement because plaintiff could not establish likely confusion). 
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plaintiffs seeking a permanent injunction have declined just slightly 
in the last decade, this decline is dwarfed by a substantial increase in 
win rates for trademark infringement plaintiffs seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction. 
According to the Darts-ip platform, for the three years prior to 
eBay, prevailing trademark infringement plaintiffs in the federal 
district courts (i.e., those for whom likelihood of confusion had 
been found in a claim of trademark infringement) went on to re-
ceive a preliminary injunction in about fifty-three percent of cases, 
and a permanent injunction ninety-five percent of the time, for a 
combined win rate of about sixty-eight percent.106 An analogous 
report for a recent three year period (May 15, 2012–May 15, 2015), 
by contrast, reveals that plaintiffs in the same position received a 
preliminary injunction about sixty-four percent of the time, and a 
permanent injunction ninety-three percent of the time, for a com-
bined win rate of about seventy-nine percent.107 
In other words, while win rates for those seeking permanent in-
junctions against the use of a confusingly similar mark declined by 
about two percent after eBay, preliminary injunction movants saw 
about an eleven percent increase in the rate at which they were 
granted injunctions against trademark infringement.108 
f) A Note on Preliminary Versus Permanent Injunctive 
Relief 
In concluding this review of the post-eBay muddle, it is worth 
highlighting one distinction not focused on by any circuit court to 
date. Namely, none of the appellate courts considering whether to 
apply eBay to trademark law have distinguished materially between 
                                                                                                                            
106 See Search Performed Using Darts-ip (on file with author). The 2003–2006 data set 
identified sixty-seven cases in this timeframe where a preliminary injunction was 
considered where confusion had been found in a “standard/classic” trademark 
infringement claim, and thirty-nine cases for a permanent injunction. Id. Darts-ip does 
not consider trade dress infringement or dilution in its category of “standard/classic” 
trademark infringement. The database includes both published and unpublished cases. 
107 Id. Based on the same criteria, the 2012–2015 data set identified eighty-nine cases in 
this timeframe where a preliminary injunction was considered where confusion had been 
found in a “standard/classic” trademark infringement claim, and 103 cases for a 
permanent injunction. Id. 
108 Id. 
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preliminary and permanent relief. Rather, the Ninth Circuit’s ap-
proach is typical, where it held that what applies in the permanent 
injunction context applies “with equal force” in preliminary in-
junction practice.109 This follows the general tendency among post-
eBay and Winter federal courts to more or less ignore the distinc-
tion for purposes of eliminating presumptions.110 
For many remedies scholars, however, the distinction between 
requests for preliminary relief before the merits of a suit have been 
determined, and permanent relief after, is vast and critical.111 This 
holds especially true in the realm of statutory injunctions,112 where 
Congress may have meant to provide a presumptive entitlement to 
an injunction to enforce a statutory right after a determination on 
the merits, but not intended to disrupt any provisional relief prac-
tices.113 It is far more problematic, for instance, to place a burden of 
production on a defendant one week after a complaint has been 
filed than one week after a full trial on the merits following on years 
of discovery.114 
                                                                                                                            
109 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013). 
110 See supra note 14. 
111 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 27, at 692 (“Preliminary relief is best considered as a 
separate issue, only distantly related to the choice of remedy at final judgment.”). 
112 See discussion infra Section II.A.2. 
113 Remedies scholars generally recommend against mechanically applying rules 
designed for permanent injunctions to preliminary ones, particularly in the realm of 
injunctions authorized by statute (i.e., those at issue in eBay and the Lanham Act). See, 
e.g., DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 246 (criticizing rules “spread without much thought” 
from permanent to provisional injunction cases). Dobbs explains: 
It is quite doubtful that a statute authorizing injunctions without 
irreparable harm is also intended to authorize a lunch-time restraining 
order without a showing of irreparable harm. The adequacy or 
irreparable harm rules serves a very different purpose in preliminary 
injunction and TRO cases. In those cases it guards against serious loss 
due to an inadequate hearing. 
Id. 
114 Cf. Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the 
Substantive Principals of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2012) 
(highlighting ways in which preliminary injunction practice can be “terribly unfair to 
defendants”). 
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C. eBay in the Eyes of Commentators 
1. Responses in the Trademark Community 
Commentators associated with the everyday practice of trade-
mark law, including Professor McCarthy and practicing attorneys, 
generally protest against extending eBay to trademark law. Writing 
in 2009, for instance, McCarthy attacked eBay’s applicability to 
plaintiff’s entitlement to preliminary trademark injunctions.115 Un-
like in patent and copyright law, in the trademark realm “once a 
probability of proving likelihood of confusion is shown, the trade-
mark owner’s business goodwill and reputation are in jeopardy . . . 
the plaintiff’s reputation is in the hands of the defendant.”116 
Moreover, the presumption was always rebuttable and never abso-
lute, thus leaving room for (in his view) the exceptional case where 
irreparable harm does not follow from likely confusion.117 In sum, 
“Like trying to un-ring a bell, trying to use dollars to ‘compensate’ 
after the fact for damage to business goodwill and reputation can-
not constitute fair or full compensation. Damage to business repu-
tation and good will is inherently ‘irreparable.’”118 
A team of franchise and related law practitioners offer a varia-
tion on this theme, which might be thought of as the distinction-
without-a-difference view.119 Upon review of a range of trademark 
                                                                                                                            
115 McCarthy, supra note 36, at 1, 4; see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:47.70 (“I 
do not believe that the presumption of irreparable injury traditionally followed in 
trademark preliminary injunction cases is in any way inconsistent with the letter or the 
spirit of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision.”). 
116 McCarthy, supra note 36, at 1, 4. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. This view is largely in accord with that of other commentators. See, e.g., David H. 
Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99 
TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1037 (2009) (“eBay should not be used to eviscerate the normal 
presumption of irreparable harm that attaches upon a showing of liability in trademark 
cases. . . . [T]he rationales underlying trademark protection[s] are sufficiently distinct 
from those motivating patent and copyright protections . . . .”); Jeffrey M. Sanchez, 
Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm 
in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 555–65 
(concluding, under similar reasoning, that the presumption of irreparable harm should 
and will survive in trademark cases post-eBay). 
119 See Ronald T. Coleman, Trishanda L. Treadwell & Elizabeth A. Lloyd, Applicability 
of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32-SUM FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 11 (Summer 
2012). 
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and franchise cases in which district courts struggled to accommo-
date eBay under a consistent theory, the authors conclude that re-
gardless of whether courts discontinue application of a “formal” 
presumption after eBay, the case “should not fundamentally alter 
the outcome” in most injunction suits.120 This is because, in prac-
tice, “the same evidence showing success on the merits will often 
support a finding of irreparable harm.”121 
2. Other Scholarly Responses See Differing Roles for eBay in 
Trademark Law 
A more nuanced academic view comes from Professor Sandra 
Rierson.122 In a piece penned just a few years after eBay, Rierson 
effectively agrees with McCarthy’s position that a presumption of 
irreparable harm still makes intuitive sense in a “traditional” in-
fringement case, such as where defendant “passes-off” its goods as 
those of plaintiff.123 She draws a distinction, however, between 
such cases and what she refers to as “propertized version[s] of 
trademark law,”124 where application of eBay might have value in 
the trademark arena.125 It may be better to be cautious and eschew 
                                                                                                                            
120 Id. 
121 Id. Along these lines, a number of trade pieces written in the wake of eBay advise 
trademark litigants to take a belt-and-suspenders approach. They generally note 
substantial uncertainty as to whether and how eBay will be applied in trademark cases, 
and then advise trademark plaintiffs to submit evidence supporting assertions of harm to 
protect them in the event that the court declines to give the traditional presumption. See, 
e.g., Steven J. Barber, Presumption of Irreparable Harm: An Analysis of Developments After 
eBay, ASPATORE, 2009 WL 3358959, at *8 (Oct. 2009); Jonathan Hudis et al., Why 
Trademark and Copyright Counsel Should Heed the Patent Precedent of the Supreme Court, 2 
LANDSLIDE 15, 18 (2009); Rita W. Siamas, Whatever “It” Is, You Can Find it In Cases 
Post-eBay: But Don’t Search for Guidance About Whether eBay Eliminates the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Infringement Cases, 50-AUG ORANGE COUNTY LAW 18, 23 
(2008). This is consistent with the distinction-without-a-difference view that the same 
result should attain with or without a presumption (just with an extra step of re-
submitting, at the remedy stage, the evidence already establishing likelihood of 
confusion). 
122 See generally Sandra Rierson, IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on 
Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163 (2008). 
123 Id. at 165. 
124 Id. For a discussion of trademark propertization generally, see Peter J. Karol, The 
Constitutional Limitation on Trademark Propertization, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1065, 1069–
75 (2015). 
125 Rierson, supra note 122, at 165. 
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presumptions where the theory of trademark liability is premised 
on newer, less generally accepted, and more de minims types of 
confusion and trademark harm, such as post-sale and initial interest 
confusion,126 and dilution.127 
Some scholars have supported a more or less total extension of 
eBay to other fields, including trademark law.128 In an article ap-
proaching eBay from a general remedies perspective, for instance, 
Anthony DiSarro concludes that, at least in a preliminary injunc-
tion context, the eBay approach is fairer to defendants because oth-
erwise they are “being precluded from doing something even 
though there has been no adjudication that such conduct is unlaw-
ful.”129 Authors such as DiSarro focus primarily on the procedural 
unfairness of preliminary injunction motions across all types of 
federal cases, citing plaintiffs’ unilateral control over the timing of 
the motion and related expedited discovery, the pressure on defen-
dants to defend cases while still investigating the facts, and the mi-
suse of preliminary injunctions as a “platform for future threats of 
contempt” to drive settlement.130 
Such arguments, though convincing within their sphere, seem 
more of an attack on the procedural device of preliminary injunc-
tion motions and have little to say about the internal logic of trade-
mark law. At a minimum, they have almost no applicability to per-
manent trademark injunctions issued after liability has definitively 
been confirmed on the merits (the posture of the eBay case it-
self).131 
                                                                                                                            
126 Id. at 181. Bernstein takes direct issue with this approach, suggesting that if the 
problem is a doubtful theory of liability, then the solution should be to recast or overturn 
the theory of liability and not to tinker with remedies. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 118, 
at 1069 (“Expanding eBay to trademark law to minimize the consequences of questionable 
decision-making exacerbates bad law by creating even worse law.”). 
127 Rierson, supra note 122, at 183–84. 
128 See, e.g., DiSarro, supra note 114, at 84 n.194, 97 (2012) (approvingly characterizing 
the Eleventh Circuit as “intimating” in the North American Medical case that eBay should 
bar presumptions of irreparable harm). 
129 Id. at 97. 
130 Id. at 53. 
131 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
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3. The Property Versus Liability Rules Literature 
Focusing its attention on the patent or copyright spaces, the 
community of intellectual property scholars focused on whether 
property (i.e., injunction-based) or liability (i.e., damages-based) 
rules regimes should govern protections for intangible property has 
remained relatively silent on the trademark front after eBay.132 
Mark Lemley and Philip Weiser, for instance, do not mention 
trademarks in their post-eBay work on the subject.133 Similarly, ar-
ticles focused on the scope of injunctive relief, or the conceptual 
relationship between intellectual property rights and infringement 
remedies, after eBay tend to take patent or copyright infringement 
as their centerpieces (often ignoring trademark law entirely).134 
While a number of respected law and economics scholars 
tackled trademark issues before eBay was decided, their pieces 
tended to focus (naturally, given the law at the time) on the ques-
tion of liability for trademark infringement rather than a court’s 
remedial options, effectively assuming that a finding of trademark 
infringement meant that defendant had to desist use.135 Professor 
Richard Epstein remains a notable exception to this trend. He spe-
cifically analyzed the fit between trademark law and real property 
rules both before, and then again after eBay, concluding in both 
                                                                                                                            
132 For a general discussion of the property versus liability rules debate see Henry E. 
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004). The seminal article in 
this arena has long been Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
133 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007). 
134 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Conceptual Relationship Between IP Rights and 
Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 827, 829, 850–63 (2015) (analyzing 
conceptual relationship between patent and copyright, but not trademark, rights and 
remedies); John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than “Off-Switches”: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2012). 
135 See, e.g., William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J. LAW ECON. 265, 300–06 (1987) (focusing analysis on when and why 
likely confusion and infringement are found in trademark law, and assuming the grant of 
an exclusive right in such a case, rather than on when and why the remedy of an 
injunction is given as a remedy); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 367, 391–95 (1999) (equating expansions in likelihood of confusion standard to 
expansions in exclusive rights of use). 
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cases that the rules governing trademarks should parallel those go-
verning real property.136 
4. Trademark Infringement as Trespass or Nuisance? 
Moving along the tracks laid by Professor Epstein, one reduc-
tive but potentially useful way to frame a future property/liability 
rules inquiry in the trademark space would be to ask whether 
trademark infringement is more conceptually akin to real property 
trespass (the archetypal property rule regime) or nuisance (a fluid 
doctrine associated with more remedial flexibility).137 
On one hand, it might seem closer to the former in that the 
trademark right is designed to put control of a valued and socially 
useful resource (the trademark) in the hands of only one person or 
entity so as to assure that the resource is consistently and efficient-
ly maintained. Like physical resources, trademarks can lose their 
value rapidly when exposed to multiple incompatible uses—
centralized control by a single actor is fundamental to the sys-
tem.138 
                                                                                                                            
136 See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal 
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 484–86 (2010) [hereinafter 
Epstein, Disintegration] (observing, after eBay, that trademark law “better comport[s] 
with the libertarian model of property” than even patent and copyright, and generally 
asserting that the rules of infringement and exclusion for intellectual property should 
parallel those for trespass in real property (citing Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: 
Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L. J. 803, 827 (2001) (“For trade names and 
trademarks the land model carries over without a hitch.”))). In both cases, the key to 
Epstein’s argument is that trademarks, like real property, are given an indefinite duration 
for good reason. Putting a strong brand into the public domain destroys its source-
associative function, and thus its value, without any offsetting benefit to rivals or the 
public. Thus, like real property, trademarks best keep their value in private hands, and are 
appropriately not subject to “arbitrary limit(s) on the duration of the interest.” Id. at 484. 
Patents and copyrights, by contrast, do enrich the public domain once given over to it, 
thus justifying a limit to the term of exclusivity and slightly differentiating their regime of 
legal protection from that of real property and trademark law. Id. 
137 See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES § 2.2 (6th ed. 2014) (describing hybrid property/liability rule nature of 
nuisance remedies). It is, of course, hotly contested whether there is any value or 
accuracy in analogizing real to intellectual property. See Epstein, Disintegration, supra 
note 136, at 456 (describing debate). 
138 Landes & Posner make this trademark/trespass comparison more or less explicitly in 
their 1987 article: 
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In presumptively granting an injunction against trespass, we 
generally avoid asking the real property owner to demonstrate why 
her use of her own property is more valuable than the trespasser’s 
attempted use of that same property precisely because we believe 
the real property regime works best when we defer to the property 
owner’s use decisions.139 So too, one might argue, trademark law 
prior to eBay presumptively abstained from weighing the relative 
value of uses made by the trademark owner and infringer because 
the regime was designed to delegate such decisions solely to the 
owner. 
On the other hand, trademark infringement law might seem a 
closer cousin of nuisance than trespass. Nuisance, traditionally un-
derstood, involves a non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest 
in the private use and enjoyment of land.140 As such, it involves in-
terference with the owner’s use of her property, but not a physical 
intrusion onto it.141 
So too, we might say, trademark infringement is best unders-
tood as an interference with an owner’s trademark resulting from 
another’s noninvasive use of a similar mark on its own goods. Like 
a nuisance claim, the infringer’s use of a confusingly similar mark 
                                                                                                                            
To perform its economizing function a trademark . . . must not be 
duplicated. To allow another maker of decaffeinated coffee to sell its 
coffee under the name ‘Sanka’ would destroy the benefit of the name 
in identifying a brand of decaffeinated coffee made by General 
Foods . . . . It would be like allowing a second rancher to graze his 
cattle on a pasture the optimal use of which required that only one 
herd be allowed to graze. 
Landes & Posner, supra note 135, at 269. 
139 See Smith, supra note 132, at 1759–60 (“Property law delegates the choice among 
these [uses] to the owner, without the need for the law to evaluate or even to specify in 
advance what these uses are. When a use falls squarely within this implicitly defined set, 
the question is not evaluating use A versus use B, but whether officials are well-placed to 
do this first-order decision making at all. Instead, officials can enforce the law’s second-
order decision to delegate the first-order decision to the owner.”). 
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
141 Id. § 821D cmt. d; see, e.g., Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 
817 N.W.2d 693, 704 (Minn. 2012) (“Traditionally, trespasses are distinct from 
nuisances: ‘the law of nuisance deals with indirect or intangible interference with an 
owner’s use and enjoyment of land, while trespass deals with direct and tangible 
interferences with the right to exclusive possession of land.’” (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 96 (2000))). 
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on its own goods does not literally prevent the trademark owner 
from doing what it was doing before. The infringer is not entering 
the plaintiff’s factory and putting its mark on the trademark own-
er’s t-shirts. Rather, the affixation of a like label to distinct physical 
goods causes an indirect harm to plaintiff’s interests (and consum-
er welfare generally) by creating consumer confusion and a weaker 
brand. As such, we are really asking an infringement (like a nuis-
ance) defendant effectively to “internalize the external harms that 
its operation causes.”142 Under such a model, we might be more 
willing to embrace eBay’s remedial flexibility in trademark law, al-
lowing damages to substitute for injunctive relief as courts some-
times do in nuisance cases.143 
II. WHY HAS EBAY POSED SUCH PROBLEMS FOR 
TRADEMARK LAW? 
Part I of this Article demonstrated the havoc eBay has played 
with the law of injunctive relief in trademark infringement cases. 
This Part seeks to better understand why eBay has been so hard for 
federal courts to assimilate in the trademark space. After discussing 
some preliminary considerations, this Article then turns to the sta-
tute itself and its legislative history to search for an explanation for 
eBay’s challenges. It proposes that courts are struggling to digest 
eBay because the Lanham Act is a particularly thorny example of a 
well-known and hard problem with statutory injunctions. Namely, 
how should a court reconcile a statutory mandate, enforceable by 
injunction, with background equitable discretion? 
In the Lanham Act’s case, the problem is exacerbated by deep 
divisions regarding the underlying purpose of the legislation. In the 
push and pull between backers of a new, truly national federal 
                                                                                                                            
142 SINGER ET AL., supra note 137, at 377. 
143 For an example of this, of course, one need look no further than the famed (and still 
controversial) case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 228 (1970) (vacating 
injunction and instead granting permanent damages in private nuisance suit brought 
against polluting cement company by neighboring homeowners). But see Douglas 
Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 7, 29–32 (2012) (characterizing Boomer as “a 
terrible opinion” and proposing, instead, renewed use of the undue hardship defense in 
place of the supposed remedial innovations of Boomer and eBay). 
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trademark law, and those wishing to subordinate the Lanham Act 
to the longstanding primacy of state-based common law trademark 
rights, the drafters worked out a compromise. Specifically, the 
Lanham Act would grant an exclusive use right to registrants 
throughout the entire United States, but the judiciary would retain 
discretion over whether and how to enforce it against infringers. 
But the drafters failed to give any guidance as to how those com-
peting concerns were to be reconciled, other than by looking to pre-
Lanham Act equity practices. 
The statutory scheme is further taxed in the Lanham Act’s case 
by the extreme difficulty of attaining monetary relief. Uncertainty 
in the calibration of the injunctive relief remedy is magnified many 
times over by not consistently awarding money damages in the or-
dinary case of infringement. 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
1. Debunking the No-Principled-Reason-Not-To Shortcut 
Before analyzing the Lanham Act and its history, it is helpful to 
dispose of one reflexive argument often made about eBay, and to 
place the law of equitable injunctive relief in some context. To be-
gin with, some might consider it obvious that eBay should apply 
with equal force to trademark as to patent law. After all, the opera-
tive statutory provisions, as the Ninth Circuit observed, use iden-
tical language in giving the district courts power to grant injunc-
tions in accordance with “the principles of equity.”144 And both 
are forms of what we call intellectual property. Why shouldn’t all 
courts just say, along with the First Circuit, “We see no principled 
reason why [eBay] should not apply” in a trademark case, and leave 
it there?145 Beyond the obvious counterpoint that courts in practice 
are wildly inconsistent on this issue (which cuts against any sugges-
tion of an easy answer), there are at least five reasons why what’s 
                                                                                                                            
144 See supra notes 41–42. 
145 Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31–
34 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 n.7 (observing that “we see 
no reason that eBay would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of 
case”). 
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good for patents (and copyrights) cannot simply be equated to 
what’s good for trademarks. 
First, the entire operating principle behind U.S. trademark law 
differs from that of copyright and patent law. Unlike the latter, the 
former is not a property interest granted by the government in or-
der to encourage creative activity.146 Trademark law, rather, is a 
form of regulation against unfair competition and a means of pro-
tecting the integrity of information about products and services in 
the consuming marketplace.147 For this reason, the U.S. Congress 
is not allowed to regulate trademarks under the U.S. Constitution’s 
patent and copyright clause; but rather must resort to the com-
merce clause for its constitutional authority.148 
Second, although concerns about “trademark bullying” do ab-
ound these days,149 trademark law has experienced nothing like the 
non-practicing entity (i.e., patent troll) phenomenon endemic to 
patent law (and which motivated at least some of the justices in de-
ciding eBay itself).150 There are a number of reasons for this,151 but 
                                                                                                                            
146 See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (“Any attempt, however, to 
identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the 
arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show that the effort is surrounded 
with insurmountable difficulties. The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to 
invention or discovery.”); cf. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1993) (“[T]he patent 
system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the 
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive 
monopoly for a limited period of time.”). 
147 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In principle, 
trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduces the 
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily 
assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the 
same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the 
past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable 
product.” (internal citations omitted)). 
148 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–94 (rejecting the Copyright Clause in the 
Constitution as a basis for authority for Congress to regulate trademarks). 
149 See generally PARKER HIGGINS, CORYNNE MCSHERRY & DANIEL NAZER, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK: PROTECTING YOUR SPEECH FROM COPYRIGHT 
AND TRADEMARK BULLIES (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/10/27/who-
has-your-back-2014-copyright-trademark_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4X7-2GZU]. 
150 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (expressing concern over “firms [that] use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”). 
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a leading one is surely that (unlike patents),152 trademark rights do 
not arise upon discovery or invention but only upon actual use.153 
Trademark law, that is, requires a bona fide practicing entity before 
rights will be enforced.154 
Third, as detailed below, monetary relief is far harder to attain 
in trademark law than in patent or copyright law. Whereas trade-
mark law generally requires a heightened showing of “actual con-
fusion” just to attain monetary relief,155 patent law statutorily 
mandates at least a reasonable royalty as a baseline,156 and copy-
right law maintains a sophisticated regime of statutory damages.157 
This counsels against mechanically extending a remedial rule from 
patent or copyright law to trademark law. 
Fourth, unlike a claim of patent infringement (which requires 
no showing of harm as part of an affirmative case for liability),158 
                                                                                                                            
151 See Michael S. Mireles, Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States?, 18 CHAP. 
L. REV. 815, 827–67 (2015) (offering eight reasons why trademark trolls will not emerge as 
a problem in the United States). Mireles includes, among his reasons, the extension of 
eBay to trademark law. Id. at 856. However, as discussed throughout Section I.B.2 of this 
Article, courts in trademark cases have hardly been universal in adopting eBay. 
152 “A patent is granted in exchange for a patentee’s disclosure of an invention, not for 
the patentee’s use of the invention. There is no requirement in this country that a 
patentee make, use, or sell its patented invention.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 
1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 
U.S. 405, 424–30 (1908)). 
153 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“[T]he right 
grows out of use, not mere adoption.”); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, 96 F.3d 1217, 
1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have 
invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership 
must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”); 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 16:11 (“Unlike patent law, rights in trademarks are not 
gained through discovery or invention of the mark, but only through actual usage.”). 
154 That entity need not be the mark owner, as use can be substantiated through a 
controlled licensee. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012). 
155 See infra Section III.B. 
156 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less that a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest 
and costs as fixed by the court.” (emphasis added)). 
157 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
158 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or 
sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964) (“[I]t has often and clearly been held that 
unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement.”). 
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trademark infringement claims require plaintiff to show likely con-
fusion in order to prevail in the liability phase.159 Prevailing trade-
mark plaintiffs, unlike patent plaintiffs, have thus already made 
some demonstration of likely harm prior to qualifying for a remedy. 
Any rule mandating a further showing of harm after the patent in-
fringement liability phase thus needs some added justification in 
the trademark infringement context. 
Finally, and most abstractly, trademarks are conceptually a far 
more conditional form of property interest than patents or copy-
rights. They are protected not as things in themselves, but for the 
goodwill they represent;160 for the commercial magnetism they 
have attained, under “the law’s recognition of the psychological 
function of symbols.”161 For this reason, trademark rights are only 
assertable appurtenant to the goods or services with which they are 
used, and unlike patents and copyrights have no legal validity as 
rights in gross.162 
There may well be sound reasons to extend the rule of eBay to 
trademark cases. All of the above “principled” distinctions be-
tween trademark law and patent and copyright law, however, coun-
sel strongly against simply waving a hand at the problem by sug-
                                                                                                                            
159 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (“Any person who shall . . . use in commerce any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (“To 
succeed on a claim of trademark infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) that its mark is 
entitled to trademark protection, and (2) that the allegedly infringing use is likely to cause 
consumer confusion.”). This is equally true for infringement of an unregistered mark 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Lanham Act section 43(a)). See, e.g., Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 
F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the same essential two elements sustain a 
prima facie case of trademark infringement under section 43(a)). 
160 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (“[T]he trademark is 
treated as merely a protection for the good will, and not the subject of property except in 
connection with an existing business.”); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus 
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918). 
161 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
162 United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97 (“[T]he fundamental error of supposing that a trade-
mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an 
invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy. There is no such thing as 
property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade 
in connection with which the mark is employed.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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gesting that there is “no principled reason” not to extend a patent 
remedies case to trademark law. 
2. Equity, Discretion, and Statutory Injunctions 
It will also be helpful, before turning to the Lanham Act and its 
creation, to place the issue of equitable injunctive relief in historical 
context. To begin with, it is clearly true that, at least as understood 
by U.S. courts, “flexibility rather than rigidity” is the “essence of 
equity jurisdiction.”163 Thus, the decision to grant or deny injunc-
tive relief has long been committed to the federal district courts’ 
“sound discretion.”164 
It is equally true, however, that district court discretion has 
long been channeled through various evidentiary and procedural 
devices; “structured sets of presumptions and safety valves,” as a 
team of scholars recently put it.165 General equitable discretion, for 
instance, has long been limited by presumptions for and against ir-
reparable injury.166 Equitable discretion, moreover, has traditional-
ly been bounded by the existence of the underlying right itself, and 
a plaintiff’s general entitlement to at least some effective reme-
dy.167 
                                                                                                                            
163 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)). 
164 Id.; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978) (“It is correct, of course, 
that a federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an 
injunction for every violation of law. . . . As a general matter it may be said that ‘since all 
or almost all equitable remedies are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships 
is appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor’s discretion.’” (quoting 
DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 52 (1973))); DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.1(1), at 57 (“One other 
striking characteristic of equity and equitable remedies is a high degree of discretion.”). 
165 Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 249; cf. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.4(7), at 116 (“[T]o 
get a better picture of the discretion exercised by judges in equitable remedy cases, we 
should recognize that the modern American judge does not exercise unlimited 
discretion.”). 
166 See Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 220–25 (discussing twentieth century 
presumptions of irreparable injury for trespass in the cutting of timber, physical 
encroachment, breaches of contract to sell land, violations of restrictive covenants, 
copyright and trademark infringement, and against irreparable injury for general breaches 
of contract and dispossession of chattels). 
167 DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.4(7), at 119 (“Equity courts never claimed the power to 
deny a plaintiff’s legal rights except by substantive defenses like estoppel. . . . [E]quity 
should not exercise discretion to deny even purely equitable remedies where equitable 
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Thus, while it would have been more or less unheard of for a 
nineteenth or early twentieth century intellectual property statute 
to grant an absolute entitlement to an injunction against infring-
ers,168 thereby eviscerating any discretion by the court, it would 
have been considered perfectly normal to presume that continuing 
intellectual property infringement is an inherently irreparable 
harm, not compensable by monetary relief.169 In short, simply be-
cause “the hallmark of equity is its flexibility” it does not hold that 
the use of presumptions is inconsistent with injunctive relief.170 
This is particularly true with respect to that subset of injunc-
tions issued pursuant to statutory authority, known as statutory 
injunctions.171 Often these statutes authorize or require an injunc-
tion, but appear at the same time to retain equitable discretion to 
some degree, thus raising the “major issue” of how discretion and 
statutory purpose are to be reconciled.172 As the remedies scholar 
Dan Dobbs explains, courts regularly answer the statutory injunc-
tion riddle by adopting what is in effect a presumption: “the statute 
might be understood to say to the judge, ‘Issue the injunction when 
this statute is violated, unless you find some traditional equitable 
reason to deny it and the reason you find is consistent with this sta-
                                                                                                                            
remedies represent the only practical remedy or the only one that protects the core 
rights.”). 
168 Cf. Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 226–30 (“Even when denial of an injunction will 
result in irreparable injury to the right holder and such injury completes a prima facie case 
for injunctive relief, courts have traditionally refused to issue an injunction when such 
relief will place an undue hardship on the right violator.”). 
169 See infra Section III.A; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 209–10 (2d ed. 1839) (“It 
is quite plain, that, if no other remedy could be given in cases of patents and copy-rights, 
than an action at law for damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the necessity 
of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of his 
rights.”). 
170 DiSarro, supra note 114, at 54. Nor, for that matter, is injunctive relief nearly as 
“extraordinary” a remedy in practice as often described in theory. See Laycock, supra 
note 27, at 689. Although courts often refer to specific relief as a most extraordinary 
exception to the usual rule favoring damages, that is “wildly wrong as a description of 
what courts do.” Id. As Laycock concluded after an extensive empirical study a few 
decades ago: “Injunctions are routine, and damages are never adequate unless the court 
wants them to be.” Id. at 692. 
171 See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 243. 
172 Id. § 2.10, at 246. 
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tute’s goals.’”173 Indeed, many courts view statutory authorization 
of an injunctive remedy “as a substitute for the irreparable injury 
rule, so that, at least prima facie, a statutory injunction can go even 
if the plaintiff would otherwise be denied relief because he has an 
adequate remedy at law.”174 One scholar goes so far as to conclude, 
after a thorough review of equity practice in the modern statutory 
injunction setting, that “a court has no discretion or authority to 
exercise equitable powers so as to permit violations of statutes to 
continue.”175 
The Lanham Act, of course, is a federal statute, and in express-
ly authorizing (but clearly not mandating) injunctive relief it is best 
classed as a specie of statutory injunction.176 Viewed in this light, 
eBay’s trademark problem is actually just one more instance of the 
“major issue” identified by Dobbs of reconciling statutory injunc-
tions and equitable discretion.177 Perhaps then the most jurispru-
dentially unusual thing about the courts’ struggle to adapt eBay to 
trademark law is not their inconsistency, but rather their failure to 
acknowledge the historically vexing nature of the inquiry and prior 
attempts at solutions. 
B. The Lanham Act’s Duality 
Not surprisingly, the venerable question of how to reconcile a 
statute authorizing injunctive relief with background discretion is, 
“At least in the first instance . . . an issue of statutory construc-
tion.”178 Thus, this Article now turns to the Lanham Act itself to 
understand how it meant for judges to wield the discretion it autho-
rized. 
Two familiar statutory provisions rest at the center of trademark 
law’s eBay problem. Section 33 of the Lanham Act (“Registration 
                                                                                                                            
173 Id. § 2.10, at 246–47. 
174 Id. § 2.10, at 243. See also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable 
Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524, 532 (1982) (“The case law reflects a remarkable, though 
unheralded, consistency over the past fifty years: cases hold that statutes dispositively 
define the nature of prohibited and permitted conduct, thereby removing one entire area 
of discretion from the courts.”). 
175 Id. at 525–26. 
176 Id. at 528–29. 
177 DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 246. 
178 Id. 
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on principal register as evidence of exclusive right to use mark; de-
fenses”) states the basic principle of exclusivity: 
Any registration . . . shall be prima facie evi-
dence . . . of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the 
registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the 
goods or services specified in the registration . . . but 
shall not preclude another person from proving any 
legal or equitable defense or defect . . . which might 
have been asserted if such mark had not been regis-
tered.179 
Decades of interpretation have of course added layers of mean-
ing to the text, but as a starting point the language literally purports 
to grant a prevailing registrant the exclusive right to use its mark 
with the goods or services listed in its registration. The rights of the 
registrant are carved away by myriad exceptions,180 but the statuto-
ry baseline is an exclusive entitlement. 
The immediately succeeding provision, section 34 of the Lan-
ham Act (“Injunctive Relief”), could not be more contrary in spi-
rit: 
The several courts . . . shall have power to grant in-
junctions, according to the principles of equity181 
and upon such terms as the court may deem reason-
able, to prevent the violation of any right of the regi-
strant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office or to prevent a violation under subsec-
tion (a), (c), or (d) of section 1125 of this title.182 
                                                                                                                            
179 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012) (emphasis added); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (providing for 
liability for infringement of these registered rights). 
180 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his well-known dissent in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park and Fly, Inc., the Lanham Act expressly identifies over twenty situations in which 
infringement of even an incontestable mark is permitted. 469 U.S. 189, 206 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 206 n.1 (listing exceptions). 
181 This phrase is nearly identical to that in the Patent Act interpreted in eBay. See 35 
U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any 
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”). 
182 15 U.S.C. § 1116. The reference to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Lanham Act section 43(a)) at 
the end of the provision expressly brings claims based on unregistered rights with its 
ambit, along within dilution and cybersquatting (Lanham Act sections 43(c) and (d)). The 
2016] TRADEMARK’S EBAY PROBLEM 669 
 
Here, there is no mention of exclusivity. Rather, it speaks in 
terms of the federal courts’ “power” to grant injunctions under 
“principles of equity” and upon “reasonable” terms. It is ex ante 
discretion, codified.183 The closest the text comes to even acknowl-
edging the prior provision’s exclusive use right is in the final obli-
que phrase just quoted, referring to “any right” of the registrant. 
That, however, serves as a limit on the court’s ability to grant in-
junctions (they may only be granted so as to prevent rights viola-
tions, and not for other reasons). Utterly absent is any directive to 
protect a prevailing registrant’s exclusivity. How, then, can we ex-
plain this at least facial inconsistency? 
C. The Lanham Act’s Erratic Legislative History 
1. The Early Drafts: State Law Rights Invested with a 
National Reach 
The early hearings on the first predecessor bills to what became 
the Lanham Act were surprisingly vibrant affairs. Infused with a 
clubby chumminess,184 and filled with colorful characters referenc-
ing Moliere185 and joking about the “late German Army,”186 tran-
script notations of “[Laughter]” are not uncommon.187 The old 
boy atmosphere, however, masks substantial dissent surrounding 
what were bills beset by internal inconsistencies on critical issues. 
                                                                                                                            
section 43(a) language was added in 1988. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 
U.S.C. § 1051. It is largely outside the scope of this Article to delve into the nuanced and 
complex historical relationship between claims of infringement of registered and 
unregistered rights, except to point out that none of the myriad modern cases detailed in 
Part I of this Article draw a material distinction between the two provisions for purposes 
of granting injunctive relief. See generally supra Part I. 
183 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1116. 
184 The following statement of Edward S. Rogers, a chief proponent of the bill, is 
representative: “[Y]ou know in every well-conducted club the man that complains most 
bitterly about the food is put on the house committee. I found myself as a result of that 
paper [criticizing the earlier trademark act] made chairman . . . .” Trade-marks: Hearings 
on H.R. 6248 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 23 (1926) [hereinafter Hearings 
on H.R. 6248] (statement of Edward S. Rogers). 
185 Id. 
186 Registration of Trade-marks: Joint Hearings on S. 2679 Before the Comms. on Patents, 
68th Cong. 50 (1925) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2679] (statement of Edward S. Rogers). 
187 Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 20, 26. 
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Namely, the central question of what it means to grant a national 
exclusive use right to a common law-based trademark. 
On one hand, the Senate’s initial Ernst bill of 1924 purported to 
do little more than codify the common law of trademarks, including 
the recently-Supreme-Court-endorsed common law principle that 
trademark rights can by definition extend no further than the geo-
graphic reach of that usage in trade.188 The definitions section, for 
instance, ended with the firm declaration that “Except as other-
wise expressly provided, this act is declaratory of the common law 
as to trade-marks . . . and in case of doubt its provisions are to be 
construed accordingly.”189 Consistent with this, proponents of the 
bill repeatedly described it (perhaps disingenuously) before the 
committee as merely “procedural” in nature,190 a codification of 
the common law,191 and modestly intended only to unify and clarify 
in one statute the confusing array of federal trademark bills already 
in force.192 
                                                                                                                            
188 S. 2679, 68th Cong. §31 (1924). For the referenced Supreme Court precedent see 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) (“Since it is the trade, and 
not the mark, that is to be protected, a trade-mark . . . extends to every market where the 
trader’s goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark, of 
itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to 
offer the article.”). But see Hearings on S. 2679, supra note 186, at 55 (statement of James 
T. Newton) (admitting that the bill goes “a little bit beyond” Hanover Star Milling, which 
involved only unregistered rights, by investing registrations with a national reach, and 
speculating that the drafters “anticipated what we believe the court would decide”). 
189 Hearings on S. 2679, supra note 186, at 16. 
190 Id. at 47 (statement of Edward S. Rogers) (stating that “section 18 is procedural 
entirely”); id. at 75 (statement of Arthur C. Fraser) (stating that the bill works “by way of 
simplifying procedure in trade-mark matters”); id. at 66–67 (“This registration does not 
grant any rights. It is simply the public record of a claim of right, which on examination, 
by the Patent Office, appears to be well-founded. . . . The act if passed will simply 
perpetuate the present law in the main, but will make it more clear and elaborate it in 
certain respects . . . .”). 
191 Id. at 55 (statement of James T. Newton) (“We have tried to formulate what the 
courts have held to be the trade-mark law. I am sure there is nothing in this bill that is 
contrary to any decision of a court of last resort. The bill is really a formula of the words in 
those decisions.”). 
192 Id. at 4 (statement of Am. Bar Ass’n) (describing need of “co-ordination and 
codification” of “scattered” “Federal statutory law of trade-marks”). In introducing the 
successor House Bill, H.R. 6248, its main proponent, Edward S. Rogers, similarly 
represented to the joint committee: 
[S]ince there is no Federal common law, we have sought in this bill 
only to apply the common law of trade-marks to commerce, over 
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In stark contrast to these demure (and state-law-friendly) cha-
racterizations of the early legislation was the operative text of its 
core provisions. Under the original Senate bill, an applicant for reg-
istration of a valid trademark, after declaring that he was “entitled 
to the exclusive use of the trade-mark in the United States,”193 
would receive a registration that was “prima facie evidence of 
ownership”194 and “constructive notice to all persons.”195 The 
proposed remedial provisions clarified the reach and power of this 
exclusive right in no uncertain terms: An infringer “shall be lia-
ble . . . to an injunction retraining infringement of such registered 
trade-mark,” which, subject only to the rights of registered concur-
rent users, “shall extend throughout the United States and shall 
not be limited to be merely coextensive with the territory within 
which such owner has used such registered trade-mark.”196 
The entire design here, utterly contrary to the common law, 
was structured to give brand owners the clear, national, and, criti-
cally, exclusive right to use the subject mark with the registered 
goods and services.197 This tension was not lost on dissenters, who 
specifically objected to the inconsistency of granting national ex-
clusive rights, enforced by a nationwide injunction, while purport-
ing to maintain the more territorially localized common law.198 
                                                                                                                            
which Congress has jurisdiction. We have not attempted to create 
anything or to grant anything to anybody, but simply to preserve 
evidence so that the common law would afford quicker and more 
complete protection. 
Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 24 (statement of Edward S. Rogers). 
193 See Hearings on S. 2679, supra note 186, at 6–7. 
194 Id. at 7. 
195 Id. at 8. 
196 Id. at 13. 
197 See, e.g., id. at 77 (statement of Edward S. Rogers) (“The purpose [of section 18(h)] 
was, of course, to make the right as nearly national as possible.”). 
198 See, e.g., id. at 77, 134–35 (statement of Robert Watson) (inquiring about section 
18(h) and noting the difficulty of making registered trade mark rights exclusive national 
rights while still maintaining fidelity to the common law’s requirement that trademark 
rights can only extend to the reaches of plaintiff’s actual use of the mark). Robert Watson 
proposed as a solution striking out the “claim for exclusive right to the United States” in 
the applicant’s declaration. Id. at 135; see id. at 55 (statement of James T. Newton) 
(“After completing the bill there were a good many prominent members of the bar, 
undoubtedly sound in their reasonings in general, who objected to the bill . . . .”). 
672 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:625 
 
The drafters responded by offering some amendments in the 
next year’s version of the bill, known as the Vestal bill, which at-
tempted to counter the strength of the exclusive right by making 
the injunction remedy more discretionary.199 But these changes did 
not appear to placate the dissenters. They continued to complain, 
for instance, that “[t]he bill has one purpose . . . and that is to na-
tionalize trade-mark ownership by registration; to take this com-
mon-law right which arises in the States . . . put it through the rolls 
and hand him out something that extends, like a copyright all over 
the United States.”200 Karl Fenning, chairman of what is now the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, similarly ob-
served, “Registration is in derogation of the common law” and 
criticized the inconsistency of purporting to invest registered 
trademarks with national exclusivity while claiming to preserve the 
common law scheme.201 
Meaningful criticism was, as shown, brought against the self-
contradictory nature of the Ernst and Vestal bills. The bills’ leading 
proponent, Edward Rogers, and others, moreover, tried to add in 
                                                                                                                            
199 Specifically, the Hearings on H.R. 6248 tracked most of the statutory language 
described above. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. The mandatory “shalls” 
in the injunction remedy, however, were softened to discretionary “mays” in the House 
version. See Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 8 (“The remedy of injunction 
against infringement of the registered trade-mark may extend throughout the United 
States or any lesser territory, as may be determined by the court according to the 
circumstances of the case, and need not be limited to be merely coextensive with the 
territory within which the owner has used such registered trade-mark . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
200 Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 138 (statement of Robert Watson). 
Relying on Roger’s own statements at the 1925 hearings to support his cause, Watson 
argued that the proposed 1926 legislation was intended to derogate substantially from the 
common law despite its claims otherwise. See id. at 136. 
201 Id. at 127 (statement of Karl Fenning). He continues by lamenting: 
The common law is the thing which the courts enforce at the present 
time. . . . The common law still controls. Now, having put in these 35 
sections this bill says, “nothing in this act shall prevent, lessen, 
impede, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which any party 
aggrieved by any wrongful use of any trade-mark may have had at 
common law.” . . . That is, we go through all this fol de rol, and when 
we get through we say we don’t mean anything. You all go back to the 
common law and start right where you are. 
Id. Fenning instead advocated for a more consistently federalized bill that would actually 
“put some teeth into” the registration scheme. Id. at 130. 
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some discretion to check that criticism. Far more early controver-
sy, however, was generated by the unrelated deposit provisions.202 
Thus, while the Vestal bill twice passed the House and was re-
ported favorably by the relevant Senate committee, it never became 
law.203 
2. The Middle-Period Drafts: A True Attempt at 
Nationalization 
Ten years and a number of intervening attempts later the draf-
ters, still lead by Edward Rogers, tried a different approach at re-
conciling the conflict between federal exclusivity through registra-
tion and the common law model of use-based fragmentation. By 
1937, a new problem was perceived to have arisen in trademark 
law—namely, the rise of compulsory state trademark registration 
regimes.204 States, allegedly to generate Depression-era revenue, 
had begun passing laws effectively requiring registration in that 
state for marks used there.205 Businesses that failed to register 
could see their marks appropriated by those that did. Thus, for in-
stance, Rogers explained that a major pharmaceutical company 
might find itself forced to register each of its 100-odd brands in 
each such state, at no small expense to itself.206 
The solution, according to the first true “Lanham” bill, H.R. 
9041 of 1938,207 was finally to create a truly “substantive” federal 
trademark law that would regulate all interstate commerce and su-
persede state law.208 The bill dropped any mention of tracking the 
                                                                                                                            
202 Id. at 12, 17 (statement of A.C. Paul) (describing opposition from Henry Thomson 
(founder of the search company) and the United States Trade Mark Association (now 
known as “INTA”)); id. at 73–78 (statement of Walter C. Hughes) (objecting to the bill). 
203 Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Comm. on Patents, Subcomm. on Trade-
Marks, 75th Cong. 11 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 9041] (statement of Edward S. 
Rogers). 
204 See id. at 12. 
205 See id. 
206 Id. at 11–12 (outlining mandatory state registration phenomenon). 
207 H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. (1938). 
208 See Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note 203, at 14 (statement of Henry D. Williams); 
see also id. at 15 (“We propose . . . doing away with the present arrangement wherein the 
trade-mark rights rest solely on the common law, or the common law as modified by State 
statutes. The scheme is stupendous in its effects.”). 
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“common law,”209 and instead made it “unlawful” to “use in 
commerce” any mark likely to be confused with a registered 
mark.210 The scope was truly national, with certificates of registra-
tion “effective throughout the United States.”211 Infringers re-
mained “liable—to (1) an injunction restraining infringement of 
such registered trade-mark” throughout the United States, enfor-
ceable by any court having jurisdiction.212 The sole remedial excep-
tion was a limited prior user affirmative defense.213 The goal was 
clear—to pass “a single statute which makes trade-mark property 
more secure, to the full extent of Congressional power over it.”214 
Representative Fritz Lanham himself thought the Act, if passed, 
would go so far as to preempt the trademark field (what he called 
“an assertion of domination of interstate commerce by Congress”) 
to the exclusion of state law.215 
Dissenting commentators likewise saw this first Lanham draft 
as a “stupendous” shift.216 A representative for the Boston Patent 
Law Association saw it as a “complete change in the theory of 
trade-marks” in that it would “substitute for [the common law] a 
creation of an artificial monopoly in a trade-mark by an act of regis-
tration.”217 This same commentator added that “the remedies 
                                                                                                                            
209 See, e.g., H.R. 9041 § 43 (eliminating the language mandating interpretations 
consistent with the common law). 
210 Id. at pmbl. 
211 Id. § 8. 
212 Id. §§ 34(a)(1), 38. 
213 Id. § 34(b). 
214 Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note 203, at 11, 13 (statement of Edward S. Rogers); see 
also id. at 25 (statement of John A. Dienner) (advocating for creation of a true “Federal 
trade-mark”); id. at 62 (statement of U.S. Trade-mark Ass’n) (supporting Congress 
“entering into the field of substantive trade-mark law” with the Lanham bill). More than 
one colloquy at the hearing concerned whether trademark rights are properly understood 
as a “property right”; however, even by 1938 this was considered to be an age-old and 
largely immaterial dispute. See, e.g., id. at 50 (statement of Edward S. Rogers) (“Of 
course there has been a dispute always as to whether a trade-mark was property or 
not. . . . What we are trying to do by this measure is to give greater security to that 
property, and whether it is property or not, it is certainly a right, and it is a right to be 
secured against fraud, and that is all that any trade-mark is, in its last analysis.”); cf. id. at 
53 (Rogers himself considered trademarks as property, and infringements as trespasses to 
that property). 
215 Id. at 45 (statement of Rep. Fritz G. Lanham). 
216 Id. at 15 (statement of Henry D. Williams). 
217 Id. at 38 (statement of Harrison F. Lyman). 
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which it provides for the infringement of this artificially created 
right are very stringent and are far-reaching.”218 
Even Rogers, however, ultimately stopped short of embracing 
the most extreme implications of such a federalized and proper-
tized piece of legislation as the first Lanham bill—namely, an abso-
lute entitlement for a registrant to stop infringing uses. For all his 
advocacy for strengthening the “trade-mark property” right, he 
still understood the bill as giving some level of remedial discretion 
to the courts. 
In particular, Rogers was asked by Chauncey P. Carter, a strong 
proponent of retaining a state-based common law trademark rights 
regime,219 to clarify what limits if any there were to a registrant’s 
apparently absolute right to an injunction in a case, for instance, of 
a geographically remote junior user that cannot show “damag-
es.”220 In language that is, at best, unclear, Rogers responded: 
A man does not get an injunction unless he has a 
right which is immediately likely to be infringed, or 
unless he is immediately likely to be subjected to ir-
reparable damage. Nobody wants to change the 
practice of a court of equity by this or any other sta-
tute. Section 1 [establishing liability] simply means 
that here is recognition. If you are damaged you are 
entitled to any remedy that any man who has a right 
of action is entitled to. It does not prejudice any 
case. It is a wide organic section, providing that cer-
tain acts are held to be objectionable.221 
Rogers seems here to be suggesting that background rules of 
equity, including the rule that denies equitable relief until irrepara-
ble harm is imminent, inherently limited the otherwise absolute 
exclusive right in the draft text of then section 1 (the operative pro-
                                                                                                                            
218 Id. at 43; see also id. at 30 (statement of Chauncy P. Carter) (objecting that “there is 
no reservation of common-law rights” in draft legislation). 
219 See generally id. at 30–36. 
220 Id. at 69–70 (hypothesizing a local registrant in Washington, D.C. that seeks to 
enjoin a use in Oregon or California). 
221 Id. at 71 (statement of Edward S. Rogers). 
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vision barring infringement generally).222 But Rogers nowhere at-
tempts to explain how these background rules of equity are to be 
reconciled with the registrant’s otherwise unqualified (“wide or-
ganic”) national right to prevent other uses of the registered mark 
for any goods listed in the registration.223 
Rogers was of course speaking here ex tempore, so his remarks 
must be taken with caution.224 Nevertheless, these remarks are crit-
ical. They are the most direct statement, throughout the twenty-
five year legislative history, of a drafter’s vision of the statutory 
discretion to grant or deny trademark injunctions with which the 
district courts were to be empowered in the Lanham Bill. 
Indeed, the very next draft of the text, H.R. 4744 of March 
1939,225 effectively codified Roger’s understanding—discussed 
above—that equitable discretion inherently existed in the district 
courts to enforce the injunction remedy. Namely, the new text gave 
federal courts “power to grant injunctions, according to the prin-
ciples of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem rea-
sonable.”226 This language (then section 33) has remained un-
changed to the present day where it can be found in section 34 of 
                                                                                                                            
222 In requiring “immedia[cy]” Rogers seems to have intended to track the usual rule of 
equity that harm must be “imminent” (if not actual) before a court will issue an 
injunction. See 5 BARRY A. LINDHAL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 
46:12 (2d ed. 2002) (A court of equity “is empowered to prevent imminent injury if there 
is sufficient reason to anticipate such injury and the court is satisfied that irreparable 
damage would result unless injunctive relief is granted, even though the complainant may 
not yet have suffered injury as a result of the actual or threatened violation.”). 
223 One explanation is that Rogers was prefiguring, in essence, the Dawn Donut 
doctrine. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 
1959). Under that doctrine, a registrant cannot enjoin a geographically remote junior user 
of a confusingly similar mark prior to the time when the registrant is likely to expand into 
the junior user’s market. See id; cf. Carter, supra note 5, at 790–95 (discussing Dawn 
Donut’s relation to the theory of federal trademark law). Rogers’ response, and the 
ensuing amendment to the text, however, were far broader in reach than just the Dawn 
Donut geographically remote junior user context. 
224 One explanation for this equivocation is that Rogers is acting as a slippery strategist 
here, telling the Congressmen what he thinks they want to hear in order to push his bill 
through. 
225 H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. (1939). 
226 Id. § 33. 
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the current Lanham Act.227 It is the very language at the heart of 
the eBay trademark troubles. 
Next to no mention, however, was made of this change in the 
three-day House hearings on the new bill, H.R. 4744, introduced 
six months later.228 The House Subcommittee on Trade-Marks, 
chaired by Representative Lanham, painstakingly marched one by 
one through each provision of that draft.229 Yet, apart from Repre-
sentative Lanham’s opening explanation, “A number of controver-
sies were ironed out in those [1938] hearings and this bill is predi-
cated on the results of those hearings,” the hearings give no expla-
nation as to the meaning of this change to section 33. Indeed, sec-
tion 33 is not once referenced by name in the 216 pages of tran-
script.230 Either way, like all others before it, H.R. 4744 never made 
it into law, however the equitable discretion language of section 33 
remained.231 
3. The Final Drafts: A Patchwork Compromise Lacking 
Explanation 
The robust attempts at a truly substantive and preemptive fed-
eral trademark bill in the late 1930s retreated in the 1940s to, once 
again, a modest proposed grant of so-called “remedial rights” or 
“procedural rights” designed to be more in harmony with the 
common law of trademarks.232 The comments of Daphne Robert, 
who took over as ABA spokesperson for the bill before Congress, 
regarding innovations in the bill are most notable for their unders-
tated nature. The main change from prior law, she noted, would be 
“an incentive to register” through the potential of attaining incon-
testability.233 Robert failed to refer to the statutory remedies in her 
                                                                                                                            
227 Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. §1116 (2012). 
228 See generally H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. (1939). 
229 Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Comm. on Patents, Subcomm. on Trade-
marks, 76th Cong. 12 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4744] (statement of Rep. Fritz 
G. Lanham) (proposing section-by-section review). 
230 See generally id. 
231 See, e.g., H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. §33 (1939). 
232 Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. on the Comm. on Patents, 78th 
Cong. 20 (1944) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 82] (statement of Daphne Robert). By 
1944, Robert had taken over from Edward Rogers as the ABA’s leading advocate for new 
trademark legislation. 
233 Id. at 21. 
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opening comments, noting just that registrants would be “entitled 
to protection” against imitations of a mark.234 
Reflective of the more tentative approach of the later drafts, 
H.R. 82 (which, in all material points, became the Lanham Act) 
gave conflicting direction as to the exclusive rights given to a regi-
strant.235 On one hand, the language of the bill (as with the ultimate 
statute) gave to registrants the prima facie “exclusive right to use 
the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services 
specified in the certificate,”236 and “commerce” was defined to 
include “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Con-
gress.”237 In other words, the registrant was facially entitled to the 
exclusive right to use the registered mark with the listed goods 
throughout the entire U.S. interstate economy. On the other hand, 
as discussed earlier regarding the final statutory language, the re-
medial section concerning injunctions, section 34, permissively 
gave courts the “power to grant injunctions, according to the prin-
ciples of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem rea-
sonable.”238 
That remedial discretion and the grant of exclusive rights might 
conflict was not lost on the committee members at the hearing. 
When asked point blank by the Chair of the senate committee, 
Senator Claude Pepper, whether the bill entitled the registrant to 
“the exclusive right to use the trade mark throughout the United 
States,”239 Leslie Frazer, the First Assistant Commissioner of Pa-
tents, denied that was the case. According to him, whether such a 
registrant “could successfully enjoin someone” was for “a court of 
equity to determine.”240 Senator Pepper then openly criticized the 
                                                                                                                            
234 Id. at 24. A subsequent commentator was similarly terse in describing the relief 
available to registrants as “greater” under the new act than the old. Id. at 29 (statement of 
Henry J. Savage). 
235 H.R. 82, 78th Cong. (1944). 
236 Id. § 7(b). 
237 Id. § 45. 
238 Id. § 34. 
239 Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 232, at 42 (statement of Sen. Claude Pepper). 
240 Id. (statement of Leslie Frazer). 
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bill for failing to clarify “the effect of registration” which he 
thought ought to be determined “as matter of law.”241 
The equivocal nature of the bill is further underscored by fun-
damental disagreement among commentators as to the meaning of 
these provisions. Some criticized it for failing “to get better protec-
tion” for registrants who justifiably “expected to get a deed of title 
in their trade mark.”242 Others, most particularly representatives 
of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, attacked it on 
precisely opposite grounds as a “radical” change in the nature of 
trademark rights in the United States “from protection as a mark 
as an indication of the origin of product to that of protecting an ex-
clusive right in the name of the product itself.”243 The final lan-
guage of the Lanham Act as passed, still with us today, effectively 
codified the split at the hearings by incorporating the exclusive 
rights and equitable discretion language discussed above without 
further clarification. 
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE CURRENT MUDDLE 
As shown, there is next to no explication in the Lanham Act’s 
legislative history regarding what Rogers meant when, in discussing 
limits to a registrant’s exclusive national right, he observed, “No-
body wants to change the practice of a court of equity by this or any 
other statute.”244 As the drafters immediately proceeded to amend 
the bill to add the key “according to the principles of equity” lan-
guage in the very next draft, it becomes critical to understand those 
same “practice[s].” What, then, was the equity practice of courts 
in trademark cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Lan-
ham Act was being shaped? 
                                                                                                                            
241 Id. (statement of Sen. Claude Pepper). The colloquy continues for pages in the 
transcript, as the committee and commentators try in vain to make sense of the conflict. 
242 Id. at 37, 42 (statement of Paul Struven). 
243 Id. at 58 (statement of Department of Justice). A Columbia professor at the hearing 
similarly described it as “go[ing] too far in the direction of creating new property rights 
which may be mischievous.” Id. at 107 (statement of Milton Handler). 
244 Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note 203, at 71 (statement of Edward S. Rogers). 
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A. Trademark Injunction Practice at the Time of the Lanham Act 
Much as they did just prior to eBay, courts of the first half of 
the twentieth century generally presumed that trademark in-
fringement caused continuing harm and thus enjoined defendants, 
under their equitable powers, from ongoing infringement without 
requiring further proof of injury, actual confusion, or bad faith in-
tent.245 This was particularly true for so-called “technical trade-
marks” which were registrable under earlier acts and included 
most of what we consider valid trademarks now, but excluded cate-
gories such as descriptive marks that have acquired distinctiveness 
and service marks.246 Even, however, in cases of unfair competition 
for non-technical trademarks, which unlike technical trademark 
infringement claims required an affirmative showing of fraud or 
                                                                                                                            
245 See Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 
1939) (“Generally the prior appropriator may enjoin use of an identical name by a 
subsequent arrival. . . . In such circumstances little evidence of injury, actual or probable, 
is needed—the mere identity makes it practically inevitable. From this fact comes the 
idea that a conclusive presumption of unfairness and injury exists. On such facts the 
presumption should be conclusive. Fair trade protection requires it.”); see also Feil v. Am. 
Serum Co., 16 F.2d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1926) (“[N]either a fraudulent intent to injure the 
complainant nor an actual misleading of the public need to be proved. They will be and 
are presumed.”); Nat’l Picture Theatres v. Found. Film Corp., 266 F. 208, 211 (2d. Cir. 
1920) (“[T]he necessary consequences of such a colorable imitation of plaintiff’s name as 
is defendant’s is deception of the public; and, finally, no equity is shown against plaintiff’s 
prompt demand. Therefore as matter of law plaintiff was entitled to injunction.”); 
Peninsular Chem. Co. v. Levinson, 247 F. 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1917) (reversing lower court 
and ordering entry of injunction); Coca-Cola Co. v. Carlisle Bottling Works, 43 F.2d 101, 
109 (E.D. Ken. 1929) (“[W]hen a trade mark is calculated to deceive an intent to deceive 
will be presumed and an injunction to prevent its use will be granted, even if no one has 
actually been deceived” (quoting 26 WILLIAM M. MCKINNEY, RULING CASE LAW §52, at 
874 (1920))). 
246 See Scriven v. North, 134 F. 366, 375 (4th Cir. 1904) (“There are certain elements of 
property right in a technical trade-mark . . . and proof of actual intention to injure is 
dispensed with, and injunction goes as of course . . . .”); Gannert v. Rupert, 127 F. 962, 
963–64 (2d Cir. 1904) (enjoining infringement of technical trademark; actual damage 
need not be shown for injunction to issue). For an overview of the pre-Lanham Act 
distinction between technical and non-technical trademarks see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 
21, § 4:4. 
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bad faith for liability to attach,247 the regular remedy upon a finding 
of liability remained an injunction.248 
Pre-Lanham Act courts of course retained discretion ultimately 
to grant or deny injunctions, which were never an absolute entitle-
ment, under estoppel principals,249 or as a result of equitable ba-
lancing and undue hardship analyses.250 But then, just as now, that 
discretion was “coerce[d]” by underlying rules of law.251 One can 
thus comfortably conclude that, prior to the Lanham Act, courts in 
the United States had been presuming a prevailing plaintiff’s en-
titlement to injunctive relief in trademark cases in some form since 
the time Congress passed the first trademark statute in 1870.252 
                                                                                                                            
247 See Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 211 F. 603, 608 (6th Cir. 
1914); Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278–80 (D. Ind. 1900). 
248 Scriven, 134 F. at 380–81 (“We are of [the] opinion that the complainants have filed 
[sic] to establish a valid technical trade-mark; but, inasmuch as the testimony shows 
unfair competition, which entitles them to an injunction, it is deemed unnecessary to 
discuss the distinctions which seem to differentiate this case from one of trade-mark, pure 
and simple—the foundation principle upon which relief is granted being substantially the 
same and the like remedy invoked.”); see also Samson Cordage Works, 211 F. at 611 
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction in unfair competition case). 
249 Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 24, 32 (8th Cir. 1910) 
(stating, in a trademark case, “a court of equity will not move to enforce one’s rights who 
has knowingly delayed to enforce them so long that the defendant in reliance upon the 
owner’s acquiescence in his violation of them has made such investments and so changed 
his position that it would be more inequitable to enforce the owner’s rights than to leave 
them in the state in which he has been content to permit them to be for an unreasonable 
length of time,” and rejecting defense on facts of case); see, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Crown 
Cent. Petroleum Corp. 50 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D. Md. 1943) (denying injunction in part 
because delay in enforcement suggested that plaintiffs did not truly believe themselves 
prejudiced by the infringement). But see Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888) 
(noting that delay alone is generally not a valid reason to deny an injunction against 
continuing infringement, and that laches alone, without any estoppel, bars only monetary 
relief). 
250 Int’l Film Serv. Co. v. Associated Producers, 273 F. 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1921) (denying 
preliminary injunction in unfair competition case where defendant invested substantially 
in the title of its play and did not use plaintiff’s similar title intentionally). 
251 Nat’l Picture Theatres v. Found. Film Corp., 266 F. 208, 210–11 (2d Cir. 1920) 
(reversing denial of preliminary injunctive relief in trademark case). 
252 See, e.g., Menendez, 128 U.S. at 523 (affirming grant of injunction despite period of 
delay in seeking enforcement; “the wrong is a continuing one, demanding restraint by 
judicial interposition when properly invoked.”). This tradition in the United States is 
quite longstanding. The influential early trademark treatise writer William Henry Browne 
observed about trademark remedies in 1873 that, “it is not essential that the article should 
be inferior in quality, or that the individual should fraudulently represent it, so as to 
impose upon the public; but if, by representation, it be so assimilated as to be taken in the 
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This is consistent with the view of the first Restatement of 
Torts, published the very same year, 1938, in which Rogers made 
his statements about equity practice in trademark cases.253 Using 
clearly discretionary language, the central section governing injunc-
tive relief in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases 
allows that courts “may” grant an injunction against infringers.254 
The comments explicating this discretion, though, make clear that 
“equitable relief,” not damages, is the “usual form of relief” in 
trademark cases “and an injunction is the usual relief granted.”255 
Consistent with general theories of equity and irreparable harm 
discussed previously, the 1938 Restatement’s injunction default in 
trademark cases was based on the express understanding that 
trademark infringement is a continuing course of harmful conduct 
and that damages are difficult to measure.256 Indeed, “if repetition 
of [defendant’s] conduct is likely, an injunction will issue against 
him though he acted in good faith and even in ignorance of the 
plaintiff’s interest” and even if defendant has ceased its wrongful 
conduct.257 
B. Connecting Trademark Injunction Practice to the High Bar for 
Monetary Relief 
Also consistent with the Lanham Act’s injunction-default 
mindset, the Act has long been understood to deny monetary relief 
                                                                                                                            
market for an established manufacture, or compound of another, the injured person is 
entitled to an injunction.” WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-
MARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS § 468 (1873). The first U.S. trademark act, the Act of 
1870, similarly gave a statutory right to injunctive relief for trademark infringement, 
subject to equitable principals. See Act of July 8, 1870, § 79, 16 Stat. 198 (permitting “the 
party aggrieved [to] have his remedy according to the course of equity to enjoin the 
wrongful use of his trade-mark”). The Act was held to be unconstitutional by In re Trade-
mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879). 
253 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 744 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. § 744 cmt. a. 
256 Id. (“Such an unfair trade practice is ordinarily not a single event but a continuous 
course of business conduct and the person harmed by this conduct is subjected to 
continuing, and often increasing, harm. . . . Frequently the harm may not be reparable by 
an action for damages because of the difficulty of computing the amount of the loss or of 
establishing the causal connection between the loss and the wrongful conduct.”). 
257 Id. § 744 cmt. b. An injunction, moreover, is deemed proper in three of the four 
illustrations following the comments. Id. § 744 illus. 1–3. 
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in ordinary infringement cases.258 The lion’s share of Lanham Act 
cases deny monetary relief (including both an accounting of defen-
dant’s profits and consequential damages) to prevailing infringe-
ment plaintiffs unless they can show “something more” than in-
fringement itself.259 Professor McCarthy accurately sums up the 
advice plaintiffs’ attorneys have long counseled their trademark 
clients: “[O]btaining a strongly worded injunction should be 
viewed as a ‘win’ in a trademark infringement case and that recov-
ery of a monetary award of any kind is problematical.”260 
Courts, for instance, embrace the Lanham Act’s invitation to 
subject monetary relief (like injunctive relief) to “principles of eq-
uity”261 and rarely grant such relief “without some evidence of 
fault or knowingly performing illegal acts.”262 In Pebble Beach Co. v. 
Tour 18 I Ltd., for instance, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of 
profits to a prevailing infringement plaintiff due to the absence of 
                                                                                                                            
258 See, e.g., A & H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 166 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 
1998) (finding no basis to award damages or impose royalty fees where prevailing 
infringement plaintiff offered no evidence of lost profits or other harm); Int’l Star Class 
Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(affirming denial of damages to prevailing infringement plaintiff absent evidence of actual 
confusion or pecuniary harm; remanding for consideration of whether defendant acted in 
bad faith thereby entitling plaintiff to accounting of profits); George Basch Co. v. Blue 
Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537–40 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that damages are not available 
to prevailing infringement plaintiff absent showing of actual confusion or intentionally 
deceptive acts, and an accounting of profits not available absent showing of “willful 
deception”). Common fact patterns where courts do allow monetary relief for trademark 
infringement claims include willful passing off, see, e.g., Klein-Becker USA, LLC v. 
Englert, 711 F.3d 1153, 1163 (10th Cir. 2013) (awarding $673,988.17 as defendant’s profits 
where defendant infringed willfully), and in the related holdover licensee context, see, e.g., 
Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Gadsden Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts often 
also award statutory damages for counterfeiting pursuant to their independent authority 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012). See, e.g., Luxottica Group, S.p.A. v. Casa Los Martinez 
Corp., No. 1:14-cv-22859-JAL, 2014 WL 4948632, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (listing 
various awards). For an extensive and thoughtful review of monetary relief in trademark 
cases see James K. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement under the 
Lanham Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458 (1983). 
259 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:58. 
260 Id. 
261 § 1117(a) mandates that any monetary award remains subject to the principles of 
equity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582, 584–85 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
262 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:58. 
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evidence of “palming off,” “diverted sales,” or “willfulness.”263 
Likewise, where a plaintiff seeks consequential damages, as op-
posed to an equitable accounting, most courts require a showing of 
actual confusion, not just the likely confusion needed to prevail on 
the merits for liability purposes.264 
The rule denying monetary relief in the usual trademark case, it 
should be underscored, was equally potent at the time of the Lan-
ham Act’s passage. Indeed, a leading historic case for the proposi-
tion that monetary relief requires a heightened showing of bad con-
duct beyond just infringement (such as fraud or palming off) was 
decided in 1947 (the same year the Lanham Act was passed) under 
the old 1905 Act.265 In a case of ordinary trademark infringement, 
an injunction was deemed enough “to satisfy the equities of the 
case.”266 
As these pre-Lanham Act cases also show, the difficulties of at-
taining monetary relief are closely tied to the relative (historic) ease 
                                                                                                                            
263 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 555 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947)). As a general rule of 
thumb, trademark plaintiffs see an accounting of defendant’s profits as the preferred form 
of monetary relief, due to the extreme difficulty of proving lost sales or other forms of 
consequential damage in a non-willful infringement case. See Fishman Transducers, Inc. 
v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 194 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Various damage theories are available, but 
proving causation and amount are very difficult unless the two products directly compete 
(an issue to which we return), and most cases that go beyond injunctive relief involve an 
attempt to recoup the infringer’s profits.”). 
264 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 525 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(“Although damages may be awarded for a violation of section 43(a), the award is 
distinguishable from injunctive relief, because plaintiff bears a greater burden of proof of 
entitlement. Likelihood of confusion is insufficient; to recover damages plaintiff must 
prove it has been damaged by actual consumer confusion or deception resulting from the 
violation.”). 
265 Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 131 (affirming denial of accounting). 
266 Id. at 131–32; see also Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., 118 F.2d 64, 71–72 
(6th Cir. 1941) (granting injunction but denying accounting where “no actual wrongful 
intent to injure appellant has been shown, and no substantial damage seems yet to have 
been inflicted upon appellant from the use by appellee of the trade-mark”); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 744 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (“If repetition of 
his conduct is likely, an injunction will issue against him though he acted in good faith and 
even in ignorance of the plaintiff’s interest. But in such a case, damages and an 
accounting of profits are not awarded.”). 
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of attaining an injunction.267 To the extent that eBay upends that 
assumption, these denial-of-monetary-relief cases need to be se-
riously reconsidered.268 Indeed, it is fair to say that in regions such 
as the Ninth Circuit, where eBay has been understood to put the 
burden on prevailing trademark plaintiffs to show irreparable harm 
and justify injunctive relief, those prevailing plaintiffs have the pre-
sumptive entitlement to neither money nor an injunction even 
where they have met all of the elements for liability. 
Put another way, a plaintiff that has shown that a defendant’s 
mark is likely to be confused with its valid, registered mark has es-
tablished infringement of a statutory exclusive right under the Lan-
ham Act.269 Yet, without adducing more evidence (i.e., of actual 
confusion, irreparable harm, etc.), it is not eligible for any relief. 
This comes very close to the scenario described by Dobbs in the 
epigraph of this Article: “To deny all remedy is to deny the right 
itself. . . . [It is] not so easy to think that the Congress means statu-
tory rights to come and go in the discretion of a federal judge.”270 
But that is the very result that arises when eBay is extended with 
full force to trademark law.271 
                                                                                                                            
267 Cases denying monetary relief almost universally assume that a prevailing plaintiff 
will still be entitled to injunctive relief. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 132; Brunswick, 
832 F.2d at 525; Hemmeter Cigar, 118 F.2d at 71–72. 
268 The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition does appear to relax any 
intentionality requirement for proof of damages, as opposed to an accounting of profits. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
Nevertheless, the cases remain few where a prevailing trademark infringement plaintiff 
can attain damages upon a mere showing of likely confusion because of how difficult those 
damages are to prove. See, e.g., Fishman Transducers, Inc., 684 F.3d at 194 (“[D]amages 
can be awarded without a finding of willfulness. But damages awards turn out to be 
comparatively rare in trademark cases primarily, it appears, because of the difficulty of 
proving them.”). 
269 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1114 (2012). 
270 DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 248. 
271 In the eBay case itself, the Supreme Court purported to address this apparent 
doctrinal inconsistency on the patent side by pretending that it didn’t exist. More 
particularly, the Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit for essentially confusing a 
right with a remedy. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) 
(“According to the Court of Appeals, this statutory right to exclude alone justifies its 
general rule in favor of permanent injunctive relief. But the creation of a right is distinct 
from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.” (internal citations omitted)). 
While it is of course true that the two are analytically distinct, that does not mean that 
courts should take no effort to harmonize rights with remedies. The two are intimately 
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One final quirk to consider is the interplay of trademark’s high 
monetary relief hurdle with element two of eBay’s “traditional” 
test for injunctive relief: the inadequacy of monetary damages at 
law.272 Together, they create a jarring feedback loop. Namely, ele-
ment two suggests that the harder it is to attain monetary relief, the 
easier it should be for a plaintiff to attain injunctive relief. But 
courts based their historically heightened standard for monetary 
relief in trademark cases (discussed above) in large part on the ease 
and adequacy of attaining injunctive relief. In short, the Lanham 
Act’s current scheme for relief in trademark cases appears to be as 
follows: a plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief depends on that 
plaintiff’s entitlement to monetary relief which depends on that 
plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief, ad infinitum. 
CONCLUSION 
As shown, thanks to the efforts of its federal-minded and 
strong-trademark-rights proponents, the Lanham Act promised 
registrants ex ante exclusive use rights for registered goods and 
services throughout all interstate commerce.273 When pushed in 
the hearings to defend the absolute nature of such a right by those 
who envisioned the Lanham Act as a codification of state-based 
common law trademark practice, however, those same proponents 
backed away and claimed that the exclusive right was actually sub-
stantially limited (sub silentio) by the inherent equitable discretion 
of district courts to determine when and how to enforce such a 
right through an injunction. In the immediate successor bill, we 
suddenly saw the implied understanding made express, with lan-
                                                                                                                            
interrelated. As Dobbs points out: “The ground for relief and the scope of that relief are 
both found in the right itself.” DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.9(2), at 227; see also Claeys, supra 
note 134, at 860 (criticizing eBay’s right/remedy language as confusing and possibly a 
significant “conceptual error”). 
272 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. This factor is particularly ill-suited to application in trademark 
cases. As discussed above, see supra note 263, the leading form of monetary relief sought 
in trademark cases is an accounting of defendant’s profits—an equitable remedy. This is 
not a remedy at law. When courts apply eBay prong two to trademark cases, did the 
Supreme Court mean for them only to focus on the adequacy of consequential damages, 
as opposed to all the various (equitable and non-equitable) forms of monetary relief the 
Act allows? 
273 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). 
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guage added granting ex post discretion to the courts. Nowhere did 
anyone attempt to explain how to reconcile these fundamentally 
divergent, if not flatly inconsistent, visions of trademark exclusivi-
ty. 
In the decades after passage of the Act and prior to the eBay de-
cision, the courts continued with their pre-existing, working solu-
tion to this difficulty. Per the statute, the district courts retained 
discretion to grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 
when faced with a likelihood of confusion between a protected and 
infringing mark; however, that discretion was substantially chan-
neled through the near universal adoption of a presumption of irre-
parable harm and, in many cases, equally strong appellate guidance 
that injunctions were to be the remedy of choice in trademark ac-
tions.274 This was consistent with both historic practice in trade-
mark cases specifically, and in equity’s approach to statutory in-
junctions generally (that is, by treating the statutory authority as, in 
effect, a substitute for the irreparable injury rule).275 To complete 
the delicate balancing act, the courts offset this finger on the scale 
for plaintiffs by limiting the availability of monetary relief. 
Then came eBay. Modestly purporting to apply traditional 
principals of equity, but more accurately creating a new test out of 
spare parts found throughout the law of equitable remedies, it at a 
minimum increased discretion to district courts to deny injunctions 
in patent cases.276 As eBay exploded across the legal landscape, the 
federal courts struggled to nail down what seems on its face to be a 
simple question: Does eBay, a patent case, apply to trademark law? 
Despite the fact that the respective patent and trademark in-
junctive relief provisions use identical statutory language, this 
question has bedeviled the courts—and for a good reason. eBay 
knocked over a house of cards built atop a divided foundation. The 
drafters simply could not find a way to reconcile the views of those 
who wanted to give the federal trademark law substance, by giving 
an exclusive federal right, with those who did not, preferring to 
keep the common law scheme. So it granted an exclusive right, but 
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reserved to the courts discretion to enforce it. That is an exclusive 
right to judicial discretion—in other words, no exclusive right at 
all. 
As a result, in jurisdictions such as the Ninth Circuit, holders of 
registered trademark rights that have demonstrated likely confu-
sion with a junior use, have neither the presumptive right to stop 
that use nor the right to get remunerated for it.277 In most others, it 
is anyone’s guess as to what evidence a district court will require, 
on top of evidence of likely confusion, to grant an injunction. At the 
same time, the empirical data suggest that eBay has actually done 
little to slow the grant of trademark injunctions—if anything, 
courts nationally appear to grant injunctions to prevailing trade-
mark plaintiffs at a higher rate post-eBay.278 
The most practical fix to the current chaos is likely to keep pre-
eBay presumption practice in trademark cases as something of a 
happy compromise. The default system of entitlements countered 
by equitable balancing and defenses is the closest the courts came 
to capturing the convoluted vision of the Lanham Act’s drafters for 
a judicially limited exclusive right. This could be accomplished 
through very straightforward legal analysis by recognizing that 
while eBay directly drew from copyright precedent,279 it never 
made any mention of trademark law.280 And, it is consistent with 
the historic and constitutional isolation, and principled differentia-
tion, of trademark law from patent and copyright law.281 
The better path, though, is to take a hard look at what we truly 
mean when we grant someone a federal registration for, or other-
wise acknowledge a federal right to, a trademark. Is that person en-
titled to be the only one to use that mark (or colorable imitations of 
it) with the claimed goods and services, or not? Amazingly, after 
nearly 150 years of granting trademark registrations in this country, 
we still do not have a good answer to that most basic question. 
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